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Abstract
One of the main concerns with the introduction of competition in the power sector is
the strategic behaviour of market participants. Computable models of strategic behaviour
are becoming increasingly important to understand the complexities of competition. Such
models can help analyze market designs and regulatory policies. In this thesis, further
developments on the modelling and analysis of strategic behaviour in electricity markets
are presented. This thesis work has been conducted along three research lines.
In the first research line, an oligopolistic model of a joint energy and spinning reserve
market is formulated to analyze imperfect competition. Strategic behaviour is introduced
by means of conjectured functions. With this integrated formulation for imperfect compe-
tition, the opportunity cost between generation and spinning reserve has been analytically
derived. Besides, inter-temporal and energy constraints, and financial transmission rights
are taken into account. Under such considerations, competition in electricity markets is
modelled with more realism. The oligopolistic model is formulated as an equilibrium prob-
lem in terms of complementarity conditions.
In the second research line, a methodology to screen and mitigate the potential exacer-
bation of market power due to the ownership of financial transmission rights is presented.
Hedging position ratios are computed to quantify the hedging level of financial transmission
rights. They are based on the actual impact that each participant has in the energy market,
and on the potential impact that it would have with the ownership of financial transmission
rights. Thus, hedging position ratios are used to identify the potential gambling positions
from the transmission rights bidders, and, therefore, used to prioritize critical positions in
the auction for transmission rights.
In the last research line, alternative equilibrium models of markets for financial trans-
mission rights are formulated. The proposed equilibrium framework is more natural and
flexible for modelling markets than the classic cost-minimization markets. Different mar-
kets for financial transmission rights are modelled, namely: i) forwards, ii) options, and iii)
joint forwards and options. Moreover, one-period, multi-period and multi-round markets
for forwards are derived. These equilibrium models are proposed to analyze the bidding
strategies of market participants. The potential impact of bidders on congestion prices is
modelled by means of conjectured transmission price functions.
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τν,m,ℓ financial transmission right from node m to node ℓ held by GenCo ν (MW )
τν,ℓ ℓ-th FTR in portfolio ν (MW )
η market price for spinning reserve ($/MWh)
ρi market price at node i ($/MWh)
ων,i congestion price seen by GenCo ν at node i ($/MWh)
ω∗i , ω
∗
ℓ congestion price at equilibrium for node i, and for FTR ℓ ($/MW )
∆ gν,i,h up-ramp rate for unit h, placed at node i and owned by GenCo ν (MW/h)
∆ gν,i,h down-ramp rate for unit h, placed at i and owned by GenCo ν (MW/h)
Π
(·)
ν profit for GenCo ν given by activity (·) ($/h)
Symbology:
(·), (·) maximum and minimum value for variable (·), respectively
(·)+, (·)− upper and lower bound for (·)
(·)∗ value for variable (·) in equilibrium
|(·)| cardinality for the finite set (·)
(·)f obligation version for (·)
(·)o option version for (·)
d−ν,i=
∑
n 6=ν dn,i, power to be supplied, at node i, by the rivals of ν
ut= {u = 1|t < | T |, u = 0 | t = |T |}
δi = ρoi/doi, slope of the demand function
a ⊥ b complementarity condition between a and b





Electric power systems had been traditionally operated as natural monopolies, by vertically-
integrated organizations subject to government regulation. Usually, there was a sole
provider of the service in certain regions, charging to customers a flat tariff. Since 1982
when Chile shifted the structure of its power sector, deregulation of the power industry
has taken place throughout the world. The economic argument to restructuring the power
industry has been to increase efficiency by introducing competition and, as a by-product,
to reduce energy prices for end-users.
In order to enable competition, it is necessary to unbundle the power sector into admin-
istratively independent activities such as generation, transmission and distribution, and to
guarantee an open access to these activities. The implementation of electricity markets
requires to put in place not only markets for energy, but also transmission –congestion
and losses– pricing schemes, together with a secure and reliable operation of the system
under the competition environment. Regardless of the market design, a power system
under the new business environment is basically conformed by three components: i) a pri-
mary/wholesale market where the bulk power is traded; ii) a transmission management
system which refers to the mechanism to have an open transmission system, and to imple-
ment the energy transactions; and iii) a set of ancillary services to support the reliable and
secure operation of the system.
1
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Throughout this worldwide re-structuring trend, different market designs have been
put in place; these models have been a product of technical, economical and even political
aspects. The performance of different electricity markets has shown that the process of re-
structuring has worked in some markets, such as in the NordPool and Pennsylvania-New
Jersey-Maryland (PJM) pool, and has deficiencies in others, such as in the California and
Ontario markets.
The particular nature of power systems makes the introduction of competition a chal-
lenging task. The fact that power systems must be in instantaneous power balance, together
with the interactions of its elements, adds a high complexity to their operation. In restruc-
tured power systems, although the generation sector has been unbundled, the transmission
system usually remains as a monopoly. From a market point of view, the transmission
system should be reduced to a system to inject and withdraw the traded power. Unfortu-
nately, power flows in the transmission system are determined by physical laws, and they
are limited by the network’s transmission constraints. If transmission constraints limit the
transactions, congestion arises; this impedes the free movement of power envisioned by eco-
nomics theory, and may degrade the competitiveness. In a congested network, the cheapest
generation cannot be used; instead more expensive generation has to serve the demand.
As a consequence of congestion, there are locational marginal prices; the price at each
location is always greater than or equal to the marginal cost of generation at such a node.
The difference in prices between locations, disregarding losses, is the so-called congestion
cost for using the transmission system. How congestion is managed has direct implications
in the efficiency of the generation market. Therefore, the aim is to have a mechanism to
allocate scarce transmission meanwhile it incentives as much as possible competition in the
generation sector.
In a centralized market, congestion management is implicitly accomplished in the mar-
ket clearing process, and power is traded at locational marginal prices. Such prices are the
efficient ones for trading power as they consider all the system characteristics. In contrast,
in a decentralized market, congestion management is independently carried out from the
market clearing process. In hybrid markets, besides the centralized process, bilateral trans-
actions can be implemented. Regardless the market design, all market participants have to
face the congestion costs. Since the costs are not known in advance, market participants are
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
exposed to volatile prices, making the transactions risky. An alternative to hedge against
congestion costs is by means of Financial Transmission Rights, well known as FTRs. They
are purely financial point-to-point rights, and are based upon the price difference between
selected locations for a contracted amount of power. Currently, this hedging scheme has
been implemented in several markets, e.g., New Zealand, PJM and New York.
Since the introduction of competition in power systems, one of the main concerns has
been the ability of some market participants to behave strategically in order to manip-
ulate the market prices, i.e., to exercise market power. Due to transmission constraints,
generation cannot be transmitted to all nodes of the network, and isolated areas may be
exposed to local market power. Unlike any other kind of market, the unique characteristics
of power systems1 may create opportunities for the exercise of market power. For instance,
while traditional market power is exercised by restricting production, in electricity markets
there can be conditions under which market power can be exercised by increasing gener-
ation. This fact is because of the substitutable and complementary relationships among
generations through the transmission system. It is recognized that traditional metrics for
measuring market power, such as concentration indices, do not work well for the case of
electricity markets [1]. This is due to the fact that traditional indices do not consider
suppliers’ location, network interactions and changing conditions of the system.
1.2 Preliminaries
1.2.1 Modelling competition
In competitive markets, suppliers ignore the actions of the other participants as they do
not have any influence (competitive fringe) on the market outcome. On the other side, in
the monopolistic market, there is a sole supplier. In oligopolistic models, in contrast, since
more than one supplier can alter the market outcome, they have to consider their rivals’
behaviour to determine their best strategy. Due to the market structure of power systems,
oligopoly models have become a natural framework to study imperfect competition. There
is a variety of models which can be classified depending on: i) the system elements taken
1Instantaneous match between supply and demand, low elasticity in demand, non-storability of elec-
tricity and transmission constraints.
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into account; ii) the mechanism for pricing; iii) the way the transactions are made; and iv)
the kind of suppliers’ conjectures.
Regarding the transmission system modelling, Green and Newbery [2] provide one of
the first models for imperfect competition in electricity markets without considering the
transmission system. Other models that neglect the transmission system, or consider basic
representations of the network, can be found in [3–6]. More sophisticated models have
incorporated the network configuration by means of power flow equations [7–17].
Depending on how the transactions are made, two models can be implemented: the
bilateral and the pool-like markets; however, in the presence of perfect arbitrage both
mechanisms can achieve the same market outcome [18]. In this thesis, a bilateral-like model
with perfect arbitrage is considered; this kind of market is characterized by a central pricing
mechanism for transmission, which is carried out by an Independent System Operator
(ISO), while market participants buy and sell energy among them.
Competition in electricity markets can be also analyzed regarding suppliers strategies.
A variety of models have been proposed to predict suppliers behaviour such as Bertrand,
Cournot or Stackelberg models [8, 17, 19, 20]. The key difference among these models is
the strategic variable that a firm chooses when competing against its rivals. The choice
of strategy, e.g. price or quantity, impacts the intensity of competition among suppliers,
and consequently, the resulting outcome. In the Bertrand case, a supplier conjectures that
rivals will not react to its actions, i.e., rivals will not alter their prices; in the Cournot case,
each supplier maximizes its profits considering an expectation of the output power of the
other suppliers, i.e., each supplier conjectures that whatever its output power is, rivals will
hold their output fixed. A point to be highlighted is that the Cournot equilibrium is also
a Nash equilibrium; this equilibrium establishes that every supplier achieves its best status
given the output of the other suppliers, and consequently, it cannot unilaterally increase
its profits. In the Stackelberg case, there is a sophisticated supplier who acts as a leader
and recognizes how the others act, meanwhile the remaining suppliers behave naively à la
Cournot.
With the unbundled set of goods and services in the de-regulated power sector, and
the introduction of new entities in the industry, different agents are simultaneously trying
to optimize their goals. Under this kind of multi-agent perspective, economic equilibrium
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becomes a natural framework for modelling competition. In addition, advances in comple-
mentarity theory help better understand some aspects of equilibrium [21]. An equilibrium
model can be defined by a set of optimization problems, one per market participant –
suppliers, consumers and market operator– which relate prices, generations, demands and
power flows to satisfy every market participant’s first-order optimality conditions, plus a
coordination condition to clear the market, i.e., to match supply and demand of goods and
services. If a solution exists for such a problem, then no market participant will unilaterally
alter its current position, a Nash equilibrium [13].
Various alternatives to analyze imperfect competition in electricity markets have been
proposed by means of equilibrium models [13,15,16,18, 22–27]. Rivier et al. [23] propose a
complementarity-problem framework to model the long-term operation planning problem
of a system with thermal and hydro generation units. Similarly, Bushnell [26] studies the
strategic operation planning of hydroelectrical resources within a market environment. The
author finds that it becomes more profitable to allocate hydro production to off-peaks hours,
opposite to what could be in competitive conditions. On the other hand, for the short-
term planning problem, Boucher et al. [13, 28] review different market models for power
networks; for this analysis, they use a unifying equilibrium framework. Hobbs et al. [15,18]
introduce a linear complementarity approach for modelling imperfect competition in both
the pool and bilateral markets. The authors use a marginal pricing scheme to allocate the
transmission to participants. In a step further, Hobbs et al. [16, 29] analyze the efficiency
of different inter-regional transmission-pricing policies in the presence of oligopolists.
However, most models on imperfect competition have been based upon static mod-
els, i.e., they ignore temporal constraints of generation units, such as up- and down-ramp
rate limits. Hence, this kind of model may give unrealistic market outcomes, and conse-
quently, misleading conclusions on market power may be achieved [30–32]. Ramos et al.
[33] propose a competition model based upon a unit commitment problem where first-order
optimality conditions of firms are introduced like constraints. In this model, transmission
constraints are not taken into account. In [34], a multi-period model for oligopolistic mar-
kets is presented; however, this model does not capture the generators’ ability to influence
the transmission prices, and studies the participants’ incentives from the energy-only mar-
ket. In [35], Mansur proposes an econometric approach for an ex-post analysis of market
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power and its impact on welfare. The author carries out a comparison between static and
temporal cases for the PJM market. The author finds that there is a substantial variation
from using a static approach.
1.2.2 Energy and spinning reserve markets
The implementation of electricity markets requires not only a market for energy, but also
markets for other goods and services such as transmission and ancillary services. It is now
well recognized the advantages of using an integrated market [36–41]. In an integrated
market, a multi-objective optimization is carried out so that different products can be si-
multaneously priced and procured. With this approach, the coupling nature of resources,
in addition to the system constraints, can be explicitly considered. Hence, a better consis-
tency between prices and the physical dispatch can be achieved. This fact makes the market
prices represent more accurately the actual value of the different products, e.g., energy and
Spinning Reserve (SR). Nowadays, various real markets use this integrated approach, e.g.,
Singapore, New York, New Zealand, and the new-brand market of California.
The concern of market power has been traditionally focused on the strategic behaviour of
generators within an energy-only market; however, within electricity markets, Generation
Companies (GenCos) sell not only energy; indeed, GenCos have incentives from other
market activities. For instance, a GenCo can have profits from participating in both the
energy and SR markets. Since the levels of energy and SR that a generation unit can provide
are limited by the maximum capacity of the unit, a GenCo has to define the optimal levels
of both of them simultaneously. On the side of the market, if the energy and SR markets
are simultaneously cleared, then there can be an interaction between energy and SR [42–
45]; and prices in one market will affect prices in the other. Spinning reserve (which can be
considered the most expensive and critical reserve [38)] may motivate generators to behave
differently within the energy market due to the opportunity cost between producing and
spinning. Sometimes a GenCo can shift power from one market to the other as it is more
profitable. As this shift of power can affect the generation schedule, it may impact the
energy market efficiency. For instance, if a cheap generation unit decreases further its
generation due to a SR incentive, more expensive generation will have to be used.
Although the interaction energy-SR is well-known in competitive markets, few works
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have addressed such an interaction within an oligopolistic market. In [46], oligopolistic Gen-
Cos are considered in separate energy and SR markets; in these markets, the transmission
system is not included. In [44], a one-period Cournot model is used, with a transportation-
network-like transmission system, to show the interaction of energy and ancillary services.
In [47], oligopolistic competition is modelled in the energy market, meanwhile competitive
competition is considered in the SR market; the transmission system is modelled by means
of a DC approximation. This model is then further extended to include strategic behaviour
in the spinning reserve market [48].
Another interaction may occur between energy and pollution permits markets. The
usage of such permits to exacerbate suppliers’ market power has been studied for the
California [49] and PJM [50] markets.
1.2.3 Financial transmission rights and market power
Different studies have been developed to analyze the effects of network conditions in the
severity of market power [51–54]. In [55], a survey of market metrics is presented to analyze
the fairness, efficiency and competitiveness of electricity markets. Strategic behaviour of
FTR holders has been analyzed in a two-node network [11, 56–59]. From this analysis, and
with a specific configuration, the conclusion is that if a generator in the importing node
holds an FTR, it increases its market power; on the other hand, if the FTR is held by a
generator in the exporting node, it has no effect in the market power of the generator. In
[11], Stoft shows that FTRs can, in contrast, curb the market power. Unlike the two-node
network, meshed networks produce inter-dependencies among nodes and so do participants,
making it difficult to analyze the strategic behaviour of FTR holders. Loop flows effect
has been addressed with a three-node network [22, 57–60]. Cardell et al. [22] analyze the
exacerbation of market power with an increase in production by a two-generator supplier.
Joskow et al. [58,59] have developed an exhaustive analysis of market power in transmission
for both two- and three-node systems. They analyze different network configurations for
both physical and financial transmission rights. When a generator, holding an FTR, is
at a location where it can constrain generation from other generator, the FTR increases
its incentives to withhold generation and, therefore, its market power. In a step further,
Philpott et al. [57] analyze both networks by including uncertainty, achieving similar
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conclusions. Gilbert et al. [60] study two- and three-node networks with oligopolists. They
conclude that a perfectly arbitraged single-price auction for FTRs does not let participants
enhance their market power. Moreover, they suggest that basing all the FTRs on the
least-influenced node does not enhance market power; however, the problem is about the
existence of such a node. So far, there is no general methodology to screen and potentially
mitigate the exacerbation of market power by the ownership of FTRs.
1.2.4 Markets for transmission rights
FTRs can be acquired through markets or secondary trades. Within markets, FTRs have
to be centrally allocated by the ISO in order to ensure the simultaneous feasibility of
the FTR awards. These awards are valid for a predefined time period, such as years,
seasons or months; even weekly or daily periods of ownership have been proposed. In
contrast, secondary trades are implemented in a bilateral basis. In such trades, already-
allocated FTRs can be traded among participants. However, only the size of the FTR can
be modified. Since there is no FTR re-configuration in regard with the source/sink nodes,
any trade does not affect the whole FTR feasibility, and the ISO does not have to intervene
in the trade. The ISO only updates the ownership transfers.
On the other hand, the revenue from the auction, collected by the ISO, can be allo-
cated to either transmission owners, entities that pay for upgrading the transmission, Load
Serving Entities (LSE) or Auction Revenues Rights (ARR) holders. ARRs are instruments
quite similar to FTRs; they are financial instruments to collect a share of the revenue from
the FTR market. Their economic value is determined by the clearing prices of the FTR
market.
Markets for financial transmission rights have recently arisen and they are still under
development [39, 61–63]. Diverse kinds of FTRs, e.g., obligations, options, hybrid, losses
and contingent have been proposed [39, 64–67]. Moreover, models for different kind of
markets such as static, multi-round and multi-period are still evolving. Due to the recent
introduction of FTR markets, the understanding and analysis of bidding strategies from
participants play an import role in the enhancement of such markets.
Recently, market efficiency and potential market power in transmission rights markets
have become a concern [43, 63, 68–71]. In [69, 70], the authors claim to show that markets
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for transmission rights are inefficient. They base their analysis upon the performance of the
New York market (NYISO) for transmission rights. Because of fears of market power, some
market rules have been put in place, such as prohibiting bidders to know each others’ bids
and/or immediate disclosure of FTR auction data [63]. Nevertheless, bidders need to have
available timely data in order to make proper strategies. In [68], a closed-form solution of
a market for financial transmission rights is derived. This analytical solution is based on
a market with two dominant bidders for the FTR of a major interface. Market power is
studied with different strategies for congestion price manipulation. Recently, equilibrium
models of competitive markets for financial transmission rights have been proposed in [72];
models of obligations, options and joint obligations and options are presented. Such models
are extended in [71] to study the potential impact of FTR bidders on congestion prices.
This is done by the inclusion of a conjectured congestion-price function. In a step further,
equilibrium models are extended to multi-period and multi-round markets in [73].
1.3 Research Motivation
Although many models of imperfect competition have been developed to analyze market
power in the energy market, comprehensive models are still needed to capture more realistic
conditions that suppliers face within electricity markets, and more important is that such
models can be applied to large systems. On one hand, operational constraints have been
neglected in the modelling. On the other hand, the study of the supplier incentives for
exercising market power has been focused merely on the energy market, disregarding the
incentives from other activities.
The concern about market power exercised by FTRs holders deserves further investiga-
tion. Various studies have been carried out to analyze the incidence of the transmission-
right ownership in the incentives to exercise market power. So far, all these studies have
been limited to analyze cases of two- and three-node networks. Although these simple mod-
els are useful to get insights of the problem, this problem has not been addressed in the
context of a general power network, and there is no methodology to screen potential market
power due to FTRs allocation. The complexity of such a task resides on the way to detect
the strategic position that potential FTRs holders can have in the generation market.
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Markets for financial transmission rights are becoming increasingly important. New
products and markets are envisioned to emerge. This will inevitably create more complex
interactions and extra incentives for participants. Due to the incipient experience with this
kind of markets, the modelling and development of such markets are still under analysis.
Moreover, within markets for financial transmission rights, the study of the impact of
bidding strategies on the congestion prices is still needed.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organized in six chapters and two appendices.
In Chapter 2, economics of restructured power systems is introduced. Suppliers and
demands are described; in particular, the profit maximization problem of suppliers is in-
troduced. This problem is then used to characterize competition and the effect of market
power in electricity markets. Afterwards, the congestion management problem is reviewed,
and the locational marginal pricing scheme is introduced. Basics facts of nodal prices are
then derived. The description of financial transmission rights closes the chapter.
In Chapter 3, an equilibrium model for imperfect competition in a joint energy and
spinning reserve market is presented. Temporal constraints and energy limits are included
in the formulation. Strategic behaviour of suppliers in both markets is considered by means
of conjectured functions. Within the market formulation, two kind of agents are considered;
on one hand, there is a set of suppliers who act to maximize profits; on the other hand, there
is a central entity in charge of allocating the transmission capacity among suppliers, and
also of implementing arbitrage. Whereas suppliers are modelled as price-makers, the central
entity is considered to act competitively. A profit maximization problem is associated with
each agent of the market. Afterwards, optimality conditions are derived for each of these
problems. The optimality conditions of all agents are gathered, together with market
clearing constraints, to compose an equilibrium problem in terms of complementarities. In
a second formulation, FTRs are introduced in the profit-maximization problem of suppliers.
In Chapter 4, a scheme to take into account the potential exacerbation of market power
due to the ownership of financial transmission rights is presented. This scheme is based
upon the computation of hedging position ratios. For each financial transmission bid, an
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index is computed to identify the level of hedging that such an FTR would provide to its
holder. Afterwards, these hedging ratios are used to weight their corresponding FTRs bids
that are to be used in the allocation process. How changes in the networks configuration
impact the hedging ratios is also illustrated.
In Chapter 5, equilibrium models of markets for financial transmission rights are derived.
An introduction to markets of FTRs, and to obligations and options is first presented. Af-
terwards, models for obligations, options, and joint obligations and options are formulated.
Then multi-round and multi-period markets for obligations are derived. Two kind of agents
are considered to participate in the markets: i) agents who bid to acquire FTRs, and ii) a
central entity in charge of allocating the transmission rights to those who value them most.
The pricing of FTRs is done by means of locational marginal pricing theory. How FTR
bidders influence the congestion prices is characterized with conjectures transmission-price
functions. Various properties of these markets are mathematically derived throughout the
chapter.
A summary of contributions and directions for future research is presented in Chapter 6.
The derivation of the generalized generation and load distribution factors is presented in
Appendix A, while the systems’ data for the numerical examples are given in Appendix B.
Chapter 2
Economics of Power Systems
In power systems where competition has been introduced, the activities are primarily driven
by business-based incentives. Under this new paradigm, the power system economics is be-
ing redefined in order to link the operation of power systems with the commercial activities.
In this chapter, basic economic principles of power markets are presented to help intro-
duce the topics covered in this thesis. In §2.1, the power market participants are described.
An introduction to market power is presented in §2.2. The congestion management prob-
lem is reviewed in §2.3, followed by the introduction of locational marginal pricing in §2.4.
The description of transmission rights in §2.5 closes this chapter.
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2.1 Market Participants
A market is the set of suppliers (GenCos) and consumers (demands) that interact through
potential and real exchanges to determine the price for a commodity [74]. A power market
can be based upon the minimization of the social cost, maximizing consumer surplus minus
supplier cost. Suppliers and consumers submit respectively their bids, and a market oper-
ator is in charge of computing a market equilibrium. The main behavioral assumption to
analyze power markets is that both suppliers and consumers act to maximize their profits.
In this thesis work, due to the incipient sophistication of consumers so far, the main concern
is on the suppliers side.
Definition 2.1: (The supplier problem) Let the variable generation cost of supplier ν
be defined by the non-decreasing convex function cν(gν) where gν stands for the generation
level. Let Gν be the set of operational constraints, such as generation limits, and let ρ be








s.t. gν ∈ Gν . (2.2)
where Πν(gν) is the generation profit function defined as the supplier revenue, ρgν , minus its
generation cost. The first-order optimality conditions characterize the optimal generation








gν ∈ Gν . (2.4)
These conditions establish that ν must produce at a level where its marginal revenue
equals its marginal cost1. In this setting, the market price is actually influenced by ν’s
decisions, i.e., the market price is a function of the ν’s generation level, ρ(gv). Thus,
the supplier sets not only the power it produces, but also the market price at which it
sells the power. This fact denotes a price-setting behaviour. Depending on the market
structure, different theoretical models for analyzing price-setting behaviors (and degrees of
1This assertion is valid only for an interior solution; otherwise, operational limits can be appended into
the optimality conditions by means of Lagrange multipliers.
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competition) have arisen, such as monopoly (a sole supplier) and oligopoly (few dominant
suppliers).
A special case occurs when it is assumed that supplier ν takes the market price as
given (known as price-taking behaviour), such that ρ is an exogenous variable in Πν(gν).





gν ∈ Gν . (2.6)
These conditions establish that the marginal cost of ν must equal the market price. The
fact that ν takes the market price as given leads to a competitive behaviour, as the market
price is not distorted by the decisions of ν.
Definition 2.2: (The demand) Let the benefit of consumer  be defined by the non-
decreasing concave function b(d), where d stands for the demand level. Let D be the
set of operational constraints, such as demand limits. The marginal benefit function db(d)
dd
,
known as the inverse demand function, defines the price in terms of demand levels. This
demand function is given by ρ(d) = ρo − (ρo/do)d, where ρo and do are the price and
quantity intersections, respectively. This affine function implies a price-responsive demand.
Demands with no price response are represented by fixed demand levels regardless of the
market price.
2.2 Competition in Power Markets
For a competitive power market, the main assumption is that suppliers cannot affect the
market price, and, consequently, they will bid their true marginal costs. On the opposite
side, in a monopoly there is one dominant supplier that can profitably manipulate the
market outcome; that is, the supplier has market power. By definition, market power is the
ability to profitably set prices above competitive levels [76]. However, not all high market
prices are a result of exercising market power; some high prices are only a product of scarce
generation [77]; the difficulty for making the distinction between causal factors and actual
market power leads to more cautious actions in order to avoid negative effects due to a
market intervention [78].
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In order to highlight the consequences of market power, consider the curves for marginal
cost (MC), demand (ρ(d)) and marginal revenue (MR) as shown in Figure 2.1. The compet-
itive market outcome is denoted by (∗), while the monopolistic market outcome is denoted




































Figure 2.1: Perfect competition vs. market power.
(i) The market price goes up from ρ∗ to ρm, while the output power decreases from g∗
to gm. This reduction on the power outcome is well-known as withholding of output.
The supplier will lose some money by selling less power; however, it is compensated
by selling at a higher market price. As a result, the monopolist’s profit increases from
Π∗ to Πm.
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(ii) There is a net loss of consumer’s surplus2 (area ρ∗ρmBC in Figure 2.1) which is
composed of two parts:
– a transfer of welfare to the monopolist supplier (area ρ∗ρmBE in Figure 2.1)
given by gm(ρm − ρ∗); and
– a deadweight loss (area BCE in Figure 2.1), given by 1
2
(ρm − ρ∗)(g∗ − gm).








The market power causes an inefficiency (known as net deadweight loss) because less
power is traded (g∗ − gm) than that under competitive conditions, and represents the
social cost of the strategic behaviour. Market power can arise as one of the most critical
imperfections of electricity markets, and can become one of the main concerns in the design
and monitoring of markets [79–81].
2.3 The Congestion Management Problem
Although the generation sector in deregulated power systems is usually unbundled to allow
competition, it is expected that transmission will remain as a regulated monopoly that
gives participants an open and nondiscriminatory access to the power market [82]. In
order to guarantee such an open access to the transmission, a central independent entity –
non-profit or for-profit, e.g., an ISO, is usually in charge of the transmission management.
The inherent features of electric power systems –e.g., permanent changes in demand,
inability to store energy, transmission constraints, losses and security requirements– im-
pede that perfect competition can be fairly implemented in power markets. Moreover,
the particular nature of power flows in a transmission system, defined by the Kirchhoff’s
2The consumer surplus is the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay (area OACg∗) and
what the consumer actually pays (area Oρ∗Cg∗). Similarly, the supplier surplus is the difference between
what a supplier actually charges (area Oρ∗Cg∗) and what a supplier is willing to charge (area OβCg∗).
Both consumers and suppliers surplus compose what is known as social welfare (area βAC).
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laws, entangles their physical management. Ideally, within a power market the participants
would trade power at a unique price wherever they were located in the system; the require-
ments of power would be met by the cheapest generation units –called the merit-order
generation– so that the social cost incurred were the minimum. However, when the trans-
mission system constraints limit the transactions – commonly known as congestion – the
cheapest generation may not be used and generation out of merit-order has to be used to
meet the demand or, even worse, the demand may not be entirely served. This inefficiency
(relative to the non-congested case and inherent in transmission-constrained power systems
[83]) may worsen the problems of market power [84]. Different sources of congestion can
be identified, such as thermal limits of transmission lines and security constraints. One of
the most common security constraint is the n-1 contingency, where the dispatch has to be
feasible after the loss of any transmission line [85].
Congestion Management (CM) refers to the process that is implemented so that power
transactions can take place while the transmission system operates within its limits. Al-
though congestion costs represent a small portion of the total volume of energy cost traded
in the market3, the concern must be addressed to their incidence on the market efficiency.
The goal of a CM is threefold:
• To be economically efficient so that market participants can accomplish their trans-
actions, while the system security and the market efficiency are preserved. Ideally,
this efficiency must also [87]: (i) limit the cost of congestion to exactly the cost
of redispatching the congestion; (ii) give the incentives to alleviate the congestion
to the lowest cost; (iii) be able to accommodate bilateral transactions; (iv) assign
the cost to those who generate the congestion; and (v) give stable, predictable and
known-in-advance prices.
• In the long run, to send efficient signals to encourage transmission and generation
investment.
• To facilitate instruments to hedge against congestion.
3For instance, during the period 2000-2002 the congestion rents reported by the Pennsylvania-New
Jersey-Maryland (PJM) power pool were USD M$833, meanwhile the New York ISO reported USD M$1352
[86].
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Along the trend of deregulation in electric power systems, different alternatives have
been used to tackle the congestion management problem, varying from physical interrup-
tions to redispatching schemes. They have been based on nodal, zonal and, more recently,
on flowgates approaches. Nonetheless, these alternatives can broadly be classified into two
classes [38, 82, 88, 89]: (i)a centralized-like system, based on a Locational Marginal Pricing
(LMP), which allocates the transmission within the power-market clearing process; and
(ii) a decentralized-like system, based on a transaction-based trading, which manages the
transmission system independently from the power market. The advocates of a centralized
model assert that the power market, together with the congestion management, should be
carried out by the ISO so that all the operational requirements of the system can be met.
On the other hand, the advocates of a decentralized model assert that the power market
must be carried out with the minimum intrusion of a central entity as possible. The ISO
should have the sole function of facilitating the transmission.
The Locational Marginal Pricing (or nodal pricing) scheme is based on the theory of spot
pricing [62, 90–94]. Spot pricing is the natural extension of the classical market equilibrium
theory [95]. In this pricing scheme, a central entity receives voluntary bids from market
participants, and, under the assumption that the submitted bids reflect true marginal
costs of production and marginal benefit of consumption, a central operator selects the
optimal solution via a cost minimization process, typically an Optimal Power Flow (OPF).
The outcome satisfies all the transmission constraints, balancing the system at minimum
cost, and obtaining Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). If the transmission system is
congested, even with a single binding transmission constraint, the LMPs can be different
among each other. The LMPs reflect the locational value of power which depends not only
on the generation cost, but also on the transmission system characteristics and the demand
willingness to pay. In this process, the power is traded at the corresponding LMPs and all
the transactions are done through the central operator.
An AC Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is one of the most useful tools in power systems.
Nevertheless, due to linearity, a DC optimal power flow model eases the understanding of
economical issues in congestion management; the extension of concepts for an AC model
is then straightforward.
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2.4 Locational Marginal Pricing
Let us consider a lossless power network where the finite set of nodes is denoted by I and |I|
stands for its cardinality, and K stands for the set of transmission lines. The net generation
output power at node i is denoted by gi, while the net demand at node i is denoted by di.
Let us denote the vectors of generation and demand by g ∈ R|I| and d ∈ R|I|, respectively.
We also define the vector of nodal angles by δ = [δ1, δ2, ... δs , ..., δ|I|]
T , where δs = 0 is
taken as the reference.








The real power balance at every system node is a function of nodal voltages and angles.
Under linearity assumptions, such as constant nodal voltages and small differences among
nodal angles, the nodal power balances can be defined as,
Gδ = g − d, (2.8)
where G ∈ R|I|x|I| is the bus susceptance matrix.
Likewise, the line power flows limits can be written as
Hδ ≤ z, (2.9)
where H ∈ R|K|x|I| is the reactance matrix of the transmission lines; and z ∈ R|K| stands
for the vector of maximum real power flow limits.
In order to focus on the transmission network issues, a feasible solution p∗,d∗ is assumed
to be interior; consequently, without any loss of generality, operational limits for generation
and demand levels are neglected from the analysis. Therefore, a power auction can be
formulated as the following optimal linear power flow problem:
f ∗ = min f(g,d) (2.10)
s.t. Gδ = g − d, (2.11)
Hδ ≤ z. (2.12)
The problem (2.10)–(2.12), with a convex objective function and linear constraints, is a
convex programming problem [96]. Its associated Lagrange function, £ :∈ R4|I|+|K| → R,
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can be defined as
£(g,d, δ,ρ,µ) =f(g,d) + ρT (Gδ − g + d) + µT (Hδ − z), (2.13)
µk ≥ 0 , ∀ k ∈ K, (2.14)
where ρ ∈ R|I| and µ ∈ R|K| are the vectors of Lagrangian multipliers – dual variables –
associated with Constraints (2.11) and (2.12), respectively.
In order for a point p∗, d∗ to be optimal, the following necessary conditions need to be
satisfied [97]:
∇gf(g
∗,d∗) = ρ∗, (2.15)
−∇df(g
∗,d∗) = ρ∗, (2.16)
GTρ∗ + HTµ∗ = 0, (2.17)
Gδ − g∗ + d∗ = 0, (2.18)
Hδ − z ≤ 0, (2.19)
µ∗k ≥ 0 , ∀ k ∈ K, (2.20)
µ∗k(Hkδ − zk) = 0 , ∀ k ∈ K. (2.21)
Conditions (2.15) and (2.16) make suppliers and consumers fix their operation point such
that their marginal cost and marginal benefit match the corresponding market price. Con-
dition (2.18) matches generation and demand at each system node. Condition (2.19) main-
tains the transmission system feasibility. The remaining conditions force the market prices
to agree with the optimal operation of the system, i.e., to have the Lagrange multipliers
as prices. With such a constraint, there will be no arbitrage opportunities [98].
The second-order optimality conditions are satisfied because of the convexity of (2.10)–
(2.12); hence, the solution g∗,d∗ is a global minimizer. In the economical sense, the
Lagrange multiplier ρi (also known as shadow price) associated with the power balance
at the i-th node can be interpreted as the optimal price because it quantifies the cost
(or value, from demand side) for supplying (or consuming) an additional MW at the i-th
node of the network. Therefore, the vector of nodal prices in the system is the vector of
Lagrange multipliers ρ∗. On the other hand, the Lagrange multiplier µk associated with
the power flow limit of the k-th transmission line is interpreted as the variation in social
cost (∇z£ = −µ) if the transmission capacity is relaxed; it is called congestion multiplier.
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Nonetheless, the variable µk does not represent the congestion price between the nodes
of the k-th transmission line. In fact, such a congestion multiplier is greater than the
congestion price due to loop flows in the network; only in the case of a radial network both
quantities will be equal.
Proposition 2.1: (Congestion rents) Given the vectors g∗,d∗ that solve (2.10)–(2.12),
and ρ∗, µ∗ exist such that (2.15)–(2.21) hold. If congestion occurs, then the market operator
collects money in excess –the net money collected from demands is higher than the money
paid to suppliers.
Proof. Let us consider optimality conditions (2.15)–(2.21); if (2.17) is multiplied by δ,
and substituting (2.18) in the first term and (2.19) in the second term, one obtains
〈ρ∗ , g∗ − d∗ 〉 + 〈µ∗ , z∗ 〉 = 0. (2.22)
















where Υ is the money collected by the market operator, known as congestion rents. Since
g∗,d∗ satisfies (2.10)–(2.12), and given the vector µ∗ that satisfies the KKT conditions, by
the complementary conditions (2.19)–(2.21), if µ∗k > 0, the k-th transmission line is binding






k > 0, (2.24)
where K̃ ⊂ K stands for the set of binding transmission lines; in this context, µk represents
a congestion charge per each megawatt that flows through the k-th transmission line in
congested conditions; therefore, it follows from substituting (2.23) into (2.24) that in a
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At the solution, if no transmission constraint is binding, µ = 0 and Υ = 0. Furthermore,
(2.25) also implies a spatial price discrimination of power; otherwise, the congestion rents
would always be zero.
Proposition 2.2: The congestion rents are a welfare transfer from market participants
to the ISO.




and the suppliers profits
∑
i
{ρigi − ci(gi)}. (2.27)














By Proposition 2.1, in the absence of congestion
∑









However, if congestion occurs, then
∑
i{ρidi − ρigi} > 0. Hence, the welfare from all
market participants (net market surplus) is lower than the net social welfare of the market;
the difference is the welfare captured by the ISO. 
From an economic point of view, transmission constraints have an analogous effect of
taxes on the market efficiency.
Proposition 2.3: (Locational marginal prices) Within a power market, if congestion
occurs, then there will be locational price discrimination of power, resulting in locational
marginal prices.
Proof. Let us consider g ∈ R|I|−1 and d ∈ R|I|−1 be the reduced vectors of generation and
demand, respectively; and gs and ds be the excluded elements which denote the generation
and demand at the slack node, respectively.
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The vector of maximum real power flow limits, z, for the transmission lines can be
alternatively defined in terms of nodal power injections by using the power distribution
factors, –see Definition A.1,
S(g − d) ≤ z, (2.30)
where S ∈ R|K|x(|I|−1) denotes the sensitivity matrix ; this matrix maps nodal power changes
into lines power flows.
Thus, for an interior solution, the congestion management problem can now be modelled
as follows:
f ∗ = min fs + f(g,d) (2.31)
s.t. gs − ds + 〈 e , g − d 〉 = 0, (2.32)
S(g − d) ≤ z. (2.33)
where fs = cs(gs)− bs(ds); and e ∈ R
I−1 is an auxiliary vector of ones. Expression (2.32)
stands for the power balance of the system.
The problem (2.31)–(2.33) is a convex programming problem; its Lagrangian,
£ : R2|I|+|K|+1→ R, can be defined as,
£(gs, ds, g, d , ρs , µ ) = fs + f(g,d)− ρs
{





S(g − d)− z
}
, (2.34)
µk ≤ 0 , ∀ k ∈ K. (2.35)
where ρs is the Lagrange multiplier for the power balance of the system. The first-order








With ρs being the market price at the slack node, it follows from (2.37) that the market
prices at the remaining nodes are
ρ∗ = ρ∗se + ω
∗, (2.38)
where ω∗ = ST µ∗ is the vector of congestion prices. The congestion prices are given by
the linear combination of the congestion charges from the binding transmission constraints.
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The congestion prices are added to or subtracted from the energy component depending
on whether power injections increase or decrease congestion. Under no congestion, ω = 0,
and all the LMPs are equal to ρ∗s. On the other hand, if congestion occurs, the LMPs are
composed by the slack nodal price and the congestion prices. 
2.5 Transmission Rights
Since market participants have to use the transmission in order to carry out their trans-
actions, if congestion occurs, market participants have to pay congestion charges despite
their location. These congestion charges arise from the use of scarce transmission capacity.
Unfortunately, because the market outcome is not known in advance, market participants
are exposed to volatile congestion charges. Therefore, the congestion charges introduce risk
and discourage the transactions.
If market participants acquired ex ante the required transmission capacity to implement
their transactions, and then entered in the power market, they would avoid the congestion
charges. The transmission capacity allocated ex ante is known as a transmission right. A
transmission right is the –physical or financial– right to access a transmission capacity.
Such rights can be classified into three different types [61]: (i) rights for an exclusive use
of the transmission capacity; (ii) rights to use the transmission capacity; and (iii) rights to
collect the congestion rents.
In the short term, the goal of transmission rights is to facilitate –hedge– the transactions
in the forward power market by locking a transmission usage price in order to avoid the
risk of the volatile congestion charges. In the long term, the objective is to give the right
signals to the market participants to motivate transmission investments [99].
In order to hedge against congestion costs, two kind of transmission rights have been
proposed. The first one is based upon Financial Transmission Rights. They are purely
financial as there is no physical (actual) reservation for the use of the transmission capac-
ity. They are point-to-point rights, and are exclusively based upon the prices at selected
locations for an awarded quantity of power; the holder of this kind of instruments receives
a share of the congestion rents. Currently, the FTR scheme has been or is in the process
to be implemented in several markets, e.g., PJM, New York, Australia and New Zealand.
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The second scheme for hedging is built up Flowgate Rights (FGRs); FGRs are based
on the physical distribution of power flows in a transmission system. Each (bilateral)
transaction is decomposed into the power flow share in every – economically significant –
congested line (called flow-gate). Although FGRs are related to the physical distribution
of power flows, more recently FGRs are proposed to be used as pure financial rights [39].
Thus, a market participant holding FGRs will have an associated payoff (rather than a
physical priority) only when the corresponding flow-gates are binding. In this thesis work,
emphasis is given to the analysis of FTRs.
An FTRs’ scheme can be seen as the natural complement of the locational marginal
pricing, and it is based on three requirements [62]:
(i) transmission rights must be subject to preserve the system reliability;
(ii) they must be associated with a usage pricing mechanism; and
(iii) they must be available to all market participants.
FTRs provide financial protection to their holders by reimbursing the congestion costs
for a point-to-point transaction. Hence, FTRs can be seen as hedges against price risk of
transmission congestion, even if there are large changes in net injections which can produce
changes in flow patterns, distribution factors and LMPs. FTRs naturally comprise the
power flows, dispatch constraints, contingencies, power distribution factors and non-linear
relationships that define the effect of congestion. FTRs help reduce the risk in energy
markets and can substantially impact the profitability of a market participant [100].
Proposition 2.4 A participant ν of a power market, with a transaction Tν,i,j between the
injection node i and the withdrawal node j, can be fully hedged against congestion charges
by holding an FTR, τν,i,j.
Proof. Given a market outcome with prices ρ, ν sells Tν,i,j at price ρi and buys Tν,i,j at
price ρj . Disregarding losses, the congestion charge that ν pays for its transaction is defined
as the price difference between trading locations,
Ψν = Tν,i,j(ρj − ρi). (2.39)
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Recalling the generation and congestion components of LMPs, (2.39) becomes,
Ψν = Tν,i,j(ωj − ωi). (2.40)
Thus, the transmission cost for a point-to-point transaction, in the presence of conges-
tion, is the difference in congestion components between the trading locations, regardless
of the choice of the slack node. If a transaction contributes to congestion, Ψν > 0 is a
charge for ν; in contrast, if a transaction relieves congestion, Ψν < 0 is a payment to ν.
If ν holds an FTR, τν,i,j, between nodes i and j, it will receive the following payoff:
Πν = τν,i,j(ρj − ρi) = τν,i,j(ωj − ωi). (2.41)
A full hedge occurs when τν,i,j ≥ Tν,i,j, such that the reimbursement Πν cancels out the
congestion charges Ψν , regardless of the power market outcomes. 
The transaction between nodes i and j can be represented as the superposition of two
transactions: i) one transaction between the i and slack nodes, and ii) the other between
the slack and j nodes,
Ψν = Tν,i,j
[
(ρs − ρi) + (ρj − ρs)
]
. (2.42)
This implies that ν will be paid ωi $/MWh to inject 1 MW to the slack node from its
generator placed at i. On the other side, ν will be charged ωj $/MWh to withdraw that 1
MW from the slack node to node j. Moreover, the congestion rents collected by the system
operator from congestion are the money used to honor the FTRs.
Although FTR formulations can be extended to include losses [67, 101], so far the im-
plementation of FTR markets has been focused on congestion. Three underlaying features
of FTRs that make them an attractive alternative for hedging are:
• They are only related to LMPs – injection and withdrawal points– and not to par-
ticular lines and flows; thus, the physical reality of the network (say, transmission
configuration and operational limits) is implicitly included. This also implies that
the FTRs’ holders do not have an exclusive use of the transmission system.
• Since FTRs are financial instruments, the holder collects the payments from the
contract. This allows to achieve an efficient dispatch of the system because the FTRs
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are independently traded from the energy market. Therefore, FTRs do not distort
the locational marginal prices [65].
• As FTRs hedge against congestion cost, the system operator does not have to socialize
costs when the system conditions change.
However, FTRs have drawbacks such as:
• Although FTRs are theoretically perfect to hedge congestion, they do not completely
eliminate the trading risk [102]. The holders acquire FTRs based on expectations of
future system conditions and transmission congestions; but there is not a complete
guarantee that such conditions take place.
• The allocation of FTRs can be unequitable. There may be participants that are
completely exposed to congestion. For equity, the FTRs should be allocated to all
network participants in proportion to their market shares. In [103,104], a scheme for
the equitably allocation of congestion rents is proposed. This method is based on the
actual contribution that each market participant has on the market outcome.
• The main problem of having a price per location is to evaluate the set of FTRs
combinations in order to compare the costs of different supply options and to find the
most convenient one. Given a transmission system with n nodes, there are n(n− 1)
potential FTRs. This drawback worsens off the liquidity and price certainty of FTRs
[105]. Such a liquidity may be improved as FTRs auctions are enhanced [106].
• FTRs can be used for gaming strategies. Since FTRs represent another money stream,
some market participants holding FTRs may have an extra incentive for strategic
behavior [22, 59, 107, 108].
• The issuance and reconfiguration of FTRs have to be subject to a simultaneous feasi-
bility test, which has to be centrally done. This makes difficult the trading of FTRs
in order to hedge the changing needs of market participants.
Chapter 3
An Oligopolistic Model for Power
Networks
A model for oligopolistic competition in electricity markets is presented in this chapter.
Most previous proposed models have been static, and they focus only on the energy market
incentives for strategic behaviour. In a step further, in this proposed model, inter-temporal
constraints, the spinning reserve market and the ownership of FTRs are taken into account.
Under such considerations, the competition among participants is modelled with more
realism. Thus, potential of market power can be analyzed by considering the incentives
that generators may have from different activities to behave strategically. Competition in
the energy, transmission and SR markets is modelled by means of conjectured functions.
The resulting equilibrium problem is modelled in terms of complementarity conditions. The
proposed model is illustrated by two- and six-node power systems, and then extended to
54- and 118-node systems using a DC-network approximation.
Preliminary definitions are given in §3.1. In §3.2, an integrated market for energy and
spinning reserve is described, and its equilibrium model is derived. Numerical examples
are given in §3.3 and 3.4. The inclusion of FTRs in the profit-maximization problem of
suppliers is presented in §3.5. Final remarks are given in §3.6.
28
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3.1 Definitions
The following definitions are introduced as preliminary to the description of the model
presented in this chapter.




s.t. h(x,y) = 0, (3.1)
g(x,y) ≤ 0.
where [xT yT ]T ∈ Rn, with x ≥ 0 and y unconstrained; f : Rn → R is the objective
function; h : Rn → Rm and g : Rn → Rp are the vectors of constraints.
Let the Lagrangian function £ : Rn+m+p → R be defined by
£(x,y,λ,µ) =f(x,y)− λT h(x,y)− µT g(x,y), (3.2)
µj ≥ 0, ∀j,
λi free, ∀i,
where λ ∈ Rm and µ ∈ Rp are the vectors of Lagrange multipliers –dual variables–
associated with h(x,y) and g(x,y), respectively.



























yg(x,y)µ = 0; y free, (3.5)
h(x,y) = 0; λ free, (3.6)
g(x,y) ≤ 0; µ ≥ 0, (3.7)
µjgj(x,y) = 0, ∀j. (3.8)
Because of the nonnegativity condition of x and µ, their corresponding KKT equations
are defined by complementarity conditions. In order to compactly denote such conditions,
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the symbol ⊥ is henceforth used in this thesis. Thus, the first-order optimality conditions





xg(x,y)µ ⊥ x ≥ 0, (3.9)





yg(x,y)µ; y free, (3.11)
0 = h(x,y); λ free. (3.12)
In standard notation, (3.9)–(3.12) can be written as,
0 ≤m(x,y) ⊥ x ≥ 0, (3.13)
0 = q(x,y); y free. (3.14)
As long as the functions m(x,y) and q(x,y) are affine, (3.13)–(3.14) is a Mixed Linear
Complementarity Problem (MLCP) [109].
Definition 3.2 (Conjectured supply function) Given the ν-th GenCo, with a set Hi
of generation units placed at node i, the power output of its generation unit h ∈ Hi, is
represented by gν,h,i. Thus, the net power generation by GenCo ν at node i is
∑
h gν,h,i.
On the other hand, the net power supplied (sales) by ν at node i is denoted by dν,i.
Let the demand at node i, di, be satisfied by both GenCos and ISO (by means of the
arbitraged power ai), i.e., di =
∑
ν dν,i +ai. As the power supplied by GenCos is composed
by the own power of ν (dν,i) and its rivals power (
∑
f 6=ν df,i = d−ν,i), the demand at node
i is di = dν,i + d−ν,i + ai.
Under a Cournot strategy, GenCo ν conjectures that rivals will not react to its actions,
and, consequently, the level of power supplied by its rivals is taken as an exogenous variable1
into its profit maximization problem, d−ν,i = d
∗
−ν,i.
In a step further, a general conjecture function can be used to model the rivals’ response
to the strategy of ν, e.g., to quantify how ν expects that changes in nodal prices alter the
1Exogenous variables will be denoted by an asterisk, such as d∗−ν,i. Even though they are fixed into
participants subproblems, within the equilibrium problem as a whole, they are variables that will actually
match the equilibrium values.
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level of power supplied by its rivals [18], i.e.,
d−ν,i = d
∗
−ν,i + (ρν,i − ρ
∗t
i )B−ν,i, ∀i ∈ I, (3.15)
where ρν,i is the price, at node i, seen by ν; however, at equilibrium all participants will
see the same price ρ∗i . The rivals supply response, conjectured by ν, is denoted by the
parameter B−ν,i. The higher the parameter B−ν,i, the stronger the rivals response when ν
attempts to jack up the price, and, consequently, the more competitive the market. For
the standard Cournot outcome, B−ν,i ≡ 0.
Definition 3.3 (Conjectured reserve-price function) Let rν,h,i be the spinning reserve
from unit h, at node i, owned by GenCo ν, and, thus,
∑
h,i rν,h,i be the net spinning reserve












where ην and η
∗ stand for the spinning reserve price seen by ν, and the spinning reserve
price at equilibrium, respectively. The SR price function (3.16) allows one to model the
ability of ν to influence the spinning reserve prices; i.e., how ν expects the SR price varies
if ν modifies its provision of reserve. For the standard competitive market outcome Cν ≡ 0.
All the conjectured functions described supra can be seen as a first-order approximation
of ν’s expectations at the equilibrium point. The values of B−ν,i and Cν can be paramet-
rically varied to analyze the potential impact of different degrees of price manipulation by
GenCos.
3.2 An Integrated Market for Energy and Spinning
Reserve
A spatial and dynamic oligopoly model for an integrated electricity market is formulated
in this section. In this model, GenCos can behave strategically to influence both the en-
ergy and spinning reserve prices. A lossless DC model is used to consider the transmission
system. The market is modelled with one maximization problem per GenCo, one maxi-
mization problem for the ISO, and a set of market clearing conditions to meet the demand
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requirements of energy, transmission and spinning reserve. The model also includes tem-
poral constraints; however, commitment decisions, such as those arising from modelling
startup cost, are not considered into the model since it would require the use of binary
variables [110]. Such kind of variables cannot be used in the standard complementarity
model. The proposed model is an extension of the equilibrium framework suggested in [15].
3.2.1 GenCo problem
For a GenCo participating in an integrated market for energy and spinning reserve, its
objective is to maximize profits from both activities. In an oligopolistic market, a GenCo
has also to consider its rivals’ decisions within its optimization problem. Its decision vari-
ables are the generation, spinning reserve and sale levels. Hence , the profit-maximization
problem for GenCo ν can be mathematically stated as,





s.t. h = 0, (3.17)
g ≤ 0.
The profit maximization is subject to supply constraints specifications h and g. Each
component of problem (3.17) is next described.
Profit components
Each GenCo can have money streams from the energy and spinning reserve markets.
























The first term stands for the revenue from selling power throughout the system’s nodes
at the corresponding locational price ρtν,j, across all time periods t. The second term is
the cost for supplying power from all the generation units. The generation cost is denoted




ν,h,i, where βν,h,i and γν,h,i are constants; hence, the marginal cost
is βν,h,i + 2γν,h,ig
t
ν,h,i. In order to implement their transactions, GenCos have to pay the
associated congestion costs. Both revenues and costs are affected by the congestion costs.
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On one side, ν minimizes the congestion charges (ω∗tj d
t
ν,j) that it has to pay for withdrawing







that it receives by injecting power at nodes where it has generation units –see Proof 2.4.
Under oligopolistic competition, the market prices (ρtν,j , ∀j, t) are considered endoge-




























Thus, considering the market prices, ν adjusts its generation and sale levels according to
its conjectures of rivals responses. Nonetheless, the congestion prices (ω∗ti , ∀i, t) are taken
as fixed within each GenCo problem. This assumption implies a competitive behaviour of
GenCos in the transmission market. In addition, each GenCo takes the arbitrage power
(a∗ti , ∀i, t) as exogenous too; this means that GenCos believe that they cannot influence the
arbitrage of power.
• A second money stream comes from participating in the market for spinning reserve;
the profit is given by the difference between the revenue from selling reserve at the SR









where αtν,h,i stands for the marginal SR cost. Since the SR price, η
t
ν , is taken as an
endogenous variable into the maximization problem, ν will adjust its SR levels based upon
its belief of how it can alter the SR price –see supra Definition 3.3.
Constraints
The maximization of the GenCo profit is subject to different constraints, such as:
• Power balance. This constraint makes a GenCo produce, by its own, all the power it






gtν,h,j = 0, ∀t ∈ T . (3.22)
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• Conjectured functions for generation and reserve-price responses,
−(ρtν,i − ρ
∗t

















∗t = 0, t ∈ T . (3.24)
Both conjectured supply and reserve-price response functions are used to substitute dt−ν,i




ν , respectively; hence, (3.23) and (3.24) are not
explicitly used in the model as constraints, and no dual variables are associated to them.
• Generation, spinning reserve and sale limits. These constraints follow the classical
limits of capacity, and also a maximum limit to provide spinning reserve,
gtν,h,i + r
t
ν,h,i − gν,h,i≤ 0, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, t ∈ T , (3.25)
g
ν,h,i
− gtν,h,i≤ 0, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, t ∈ T , (3.26)
rtν,h,i − r
t
ν,h,i≤ 0, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, t ∈ T , (3.27)
rtν,h,i, d
t
v,i≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, t ∈ T , (3.28)
where (·) and (·) stand for the maximum and minimum limits.
• Up- and down-ramp rates. These constraints represent the physical limitations of the
thermal units to increase/decrease their levels of output. These constraints couple together
every period with the previous and following ones,
gtν,h,i − g
t−1
ν,h,i ≤ ∆gν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, t ∈ T , (3.29)
gt−1ν,h,i − g
t
ν,h,i ≤ ∆gν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, t ∈ T , (3.30)
where ∆gν,h,i and ∆gν,h,i are the maximum up and down limits, respectively.
• Maximum energy supplied in the trading period. There can be energy-limited gen-
erators due to operating conditions, e.g., fuel or environmental constraints. Thus, there is




gtν,h,i ≤ eν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, (3.31)
where eν,h,i is the maximum energy limit of unit h. In this work, hydro-electric generators
are not considered.
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, σtν,h,i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, t ∈ T ,
gν,h,i, λ
t
ν , free, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, t ∈ T ,












are the corresponding dual variables associ-
ated with the GenCos’ constraints described supra.
3.2.2 ISO problem
The ISO objective is to efficiently allocate the scarce transmission among GenCos. This
problem can be seen as a transmission rights auction where the ISO sells transmission rights
so that GenCos can implement their bilateral transactions. These transmission rights can
be seen as reservations to inject/withdraw power among nodes. It is required that balanced
transmission rights be sold to each GenCo for their bilateral transactions. Furthermore,
the ISO carries out locational arbitrage of power in order to eliminate any price difference
that is beyond transmission costs. Consequently, the arbitrage leads the transmission price
between two nodes to be the price difference between such nodes [18]; i.e., to obtain LMPs.
















where pti, ∀i, t stands for the nodal power injections to be determined by the ISO. Likewise
the GenCos problem, the congestion prices are considered exogenous variables within the
ISO problem in order to have the ISO behave competitively. On the other hand, the ISO’s
decisions (nodal injections) have to be feasible for the transmission system constraints.
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− zk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T , (3.34)
where si,k denotes the sensitivity factor for transmission line k with respect to an injection
at node i (see Definition A.1, Appendix A); while zk stands for the maximum power flow
limit of line k.
All the power that the ISO buys has to be sold, i.e., the ISO has to be only an arbitrager,
∑
i
ati = 0, ∀t ∈ T . (3.35)
For the ISO problem, the variables pti and a
t
i, ∀i, t are unconstrained.



















































s, free, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T ,
where λt+k and λ
t−
k , and ρ
t
s stand for the dual variables associated with constraints (3.34)
and (3.35), respectively.
3.2.3 Markets clearing conditions
In addition to the GenCos and ISO problems, there need be a set of conditions for clear-
ing the markets. These conditions will force to balance demand and supply of energy,
transmission and spinning reserves; they are next described.
Energy services
This condition establishes that, under equilibrium, the price (ρtν,i) assumed by every GenCo
is the actual market price, ρt
∗













, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T . (3.37)
2Each transmission line flow is modelled by means of two constraints; one constraint per power-flow
direction.
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Transmission services
This market condition is related to the injections/withdrawals of power in the transmission
system, such that the nodal power balance is preserved at each system node; i.e., it matches













, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T . (3.38)
Reserve services





rtν,h,i, ∀t ∈ T . (3.39)
Such a level is based upon the ISO demand forecast and other operating conditions
[40]. The spinning reserve can be set equal to some percent of the demand, as in the
Spanish system [111]; or equal to the largest loss of power due to a single –generator or
line– contingency, as in the Ontario system [112]. Spinning reserve can also be provided
by loads that can decrease their consumption [113–115]. More sophisticated approaches
can be used to set the reserve requirements with either a probabilistic criterion [116], or a
demand function for reserve [117]. In this proposed model, the SR requirement is defined
as a percent (ε) of the demand; it can be modelled as a given and fixed value, or can be









, ∀t ∈ T . (3.40)
3.2.4 Equilibrium model










gtν,h,i, ∀h ∈ Hi, i ∈ I, t ∈ T
dtν,i, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T
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Let x−ν = {xı| ı 6= ν} be a vector of decision variables but ν. GenCo ν, by means of the
conjectured functions described supra, is conjecturing that the other GenCos will react in
certain way, i.e., x−ν(xν).





pti, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T














ρti, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T
ωti , ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T









Definition 3.4 (Market equilibrium) The point (x∗ν , ∀ν ∈ V, y
∗, o∗) constitutes an







ν)) ≥ Πν(xν ,x−ν(xν)), ∀xν ∈ Xν , ν ∈ V with market prices o
∗; i.e., x∗ν
solves (3.17) for all ν;
(ii) ΠISO(y
∗) ≥ ΠISO(y), ∀y ∈ Y for prices o
∗; i.e., y∗ solves (3.33)–(3.35);
(iii) the vectors x∗ν and y
∗ balance the supply and demand for energy, transmission and
spinning reserve at markets prices o∗; i.e., x∗ν and y
∗ satisfy (3.37)–(3.39).
As each GenCo and ISO problem can be defined via KKT optimality conditions, an
equilibrium will be a point that simultaneously satisfies the first-order optimality conditions
of all market participants while balancing the markets.
By Definition 3.1, it follows that the KKT conditions of each GenCo and ISO problem
is a MLCP; this set of MLCPs together with the market clearing conditions can be written
as the following and single MLCP:


















ν,i ≥ 0 (3.41)
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• For rtν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, ν ∈ V, t ∈ T :











ν,h,i ≥ 0 (3.42)
• For µtν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, ν ∈ V, t ∈ T :
0 ≥ gtν,h,i + r
t
ν,h,i − gν,h,i ⊥ µ
t
ν,h,i ≥ 0 (3.43)
• For µt
ν,h,i
, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, ν ∈ V, t ∈ T :
0 ≥ g
ν,h,i




• For φtν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, ν ∈ V, t ∈ T :




ν,h,i ≥ 0 (3.45)
• For ψ
t
ν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, ν ∈ V, t ∈ T :
0 ≥ gtν,h,i − g
t−1
ν,h,i −∆gν,h,i ⊥ ψ
t
ν,h,i ≥ 0 (3.46)
• For ψt
ν,h,i
, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, ν ∈ V, t ∈ T :
0 ≥ gt−1ν,h,i − g
t








gtν,h,i − eν,h,i ⊥ σν,h,i ≥ 0 (3.48)






i − zk ⊥ λ
t+
k ≥ 0 (3.49)
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i − zk ⊥ λ
t−
k ≥ 0 (3.50)
• For η∗ti , ∀t ∈ T :





i ≥ 0 (3.51)
• For gtν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, ν ∈ V, t ∈ T :





























t = [1, 1, ..., 1, 1, 0]T (3.52)










• For pti, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T :










• For ati, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T :
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• For ρ∗ti , ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T :












; ρ∗ti free (3.57)
• For ω∗ti , ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T :











; ω∗ti free. (3.58)































∗t), gives an equilib-
rium point of the multi-period market. In this thesis work, the equilibrium model defined
by the MLCP has been formulated in GAMS and solved using the PATH solver [118].
PATH is a numerical algorithm based on the Newton method to solve mixed complemen-
tarity problems. It uses a path-following technique which is used to construct a piecewise
linear path from the current point to the Newton point 119.
3.2.5 Energy and spinning reserve interaction
A generation unit may also provide spinning reserve rather than only energy. Nonetheless,
capacity limits impose restrictions on the available resources; e.g., the spinning reserve that
it can provide depends on the generation level scheduled for the energy market; hence, a
GenCo has to choose between supplying energy or spinning reserve [42]. This interdepen-
dency has to be considered into the market model in order to have a realistic analysis of
the GenCo incentives.
Proposition 3.1 (Opportunity cost) Let us consider a generation unit participating in
an integrated market for energy and spinning reserve, and its maximum capacity limit be
defined by (3.25). If the generation unit is providing both energy and spinning reserve,
then there may be an opportunity cost between producing and spinning if and only if its
maximum capacity limit is binding.
Proof. Consider only the terms related to energy and spinning reserve for a static case
from §3.2.4. As dν,i, rν,h,i > 0, by complementarity conditions, Expressions (3.41) and
(3.42) are strictly satisfied; thus, (3.41), (3.42) and (3.52) can be written as




=ω∗i + λν , ∀ dν,i > 0, (3.59)
η∗ =αν,h,i − Cν
∑
~,
rν,~, + µν,h,i + φν,h,i, ∀ rν,h,i > 0, (3.60)
µν,h,i =λν + µν,h,i − βν,h,i − 2γν,h,igν,h,i + ω
∗
i . (3.61)
When the maximum limit of capacity is binding, the minimum capacity limit cannot
be active, and, thus, µ
ν,h,i
= 0. By substituting (3.59) and (3.61) into (3.60), the market



















Notice that in equilibrium: ρν,i = ρ
∗
i . The first term in brackets is the marginal cost
of SR affected by the ability of the generation unit to manipulate the SR price, while
the second term in brackets represents the opportunity cost for supplying spinning reserve
instead of energy. This term is composed by the price difference between the nodal price
where the generation unit h, i is placed, and the marginal cost of such a unit and its impact
on the price by means of its sales at i. Only when the generation unit has reached its
spinning reserve limit, the term φν,i,h may count. 

































In this case, the opportunity cost is given by the difference between the corresponding
locational marginal price and the energy marginal cost. A similar relationship has been
derived in [40] for a competitive energy market. The terms related to ramp-rates and
energy constraints can also be included to analyze their impact on the opportunity cost.
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3.3 Illustrative Six-Node System
A six-node system is used to represent the transmission system, as shown in Figure 3.1. The
network is modelled as lossless and with equal transmission line reactances. Transmission
limits for lines 1-6 and 2-5 are 200 MW; these lines are labelled as 1 and 2, respectively.
The limits of the other transmission lines are large enough to be neglected.
The data related to generation and demand are given in Table 3.1. All generation
units have unlimited capacity (otherwise specified); generation units and demands are
















Figure 3.1: A six-node system.
3.3.1 Competitive energy market
Let us consider a static case for an integrated energy and spinning reserve market. The
energy market is considered to be competitive through all the cases; meanwhile, the SR
market is considered as competitive for all cases, but Case D. The reserve requirement is
set to be 10% of the total demand. The market outcomes are summarized in Tables 3.2
and 3.3.
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Table 3.1: Generation and demand data. Six-node system.
Generation Demand
Node GenCo Unit αν,h,i βν,h,i γν,h,i ρoi doi
i ν h ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MW 2h) ($/MWh) (MW )
1 1 1 4 10 0.003 60 300
2 2 1 6 15 0.005 80 400
3 – – – – – 50 250
4 3 1 7 20 0.01 60 300
5 – – – – – 100 500
6 – – – – – 80 400
Case A. No generation and SR limits
Under competitive conditions in the energy market, all generation units provide energy.
Since the power-flow limit of transmission line 1 becomes active, locational price discrimi-
nation arises, and the ISO collects congestion rents of $4800/h. In this case, all generation
units are marginal; i.e., the nodal prices where they are placed equal their corresponding
marginal cost. Due to the fact that no generator is constrained by its maximum capacity
limit, the joint optimization of the SR market does not modify the energy-only market
outcome. The SR requirement of 147.7 MW is being provided by the cheapest generator
(g1,1,1) at a price of $4/MWh.
Case B. No SR limits and g1,1,1=750 MW
As g1,1,1 is the cheapest supplier of both energy and SR, its full capacity (750 MW) is used.
If there were no opportunity cost between energy and SR, g1,1,1 would supply 672 MW for
the energy market (as in Case A), and its remaining capacity (77.92 MW) would be used
to provide reserve. Nonetheless, as such an opportunity cost exists, g1,1,1 provides more
spinning reserve (146.68 MW) by reducing the power to be supplied into the energy market
up to 603.31 MW. This withholding of capacity in the energy market is actually due to
an incentive from the SR market, not an exercise of market power. Moreover, this shift of
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Table 3.2: Energy and spinning reserve interaction. Competitive case†.
Case A B C D
g1,1,1 672 603.3 650 668.6
g2,1,2 383.2 463.8 409 387.2
g3,1,4 421.6 399.6 414.5 420.5
r1,1,1 147.7 146.6 100 81.3
r2,1,2 0.0 0.0 47.3 43.1
r3,1,4 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.1
ρ1 14.0 15.4 14.4 14.1
ρ2 18.8 19.6 19.0 18.8
ρ3 16.4 17.5 16.7 16.4
ρ4 28.4 27.9 28.2 28.4
ρ5 26.0 25.9 25.9 26.0
ρ6 30.8 30.0 30.5 30.7
d1 229.8 222.6 227.5 229.4
d2 305.8 301.8 304.5 305.6
d3 167.8 162.2 166.0 167.5
d4 157.8 160.0 158.5 157.9
d5 369.8 370.4 370.0 369.8
d6 245.8 249.5 247.0 246.0
z1 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0
z2 151.8 180.4 161 153.2
η∗ 4 5.8 6 8.1
λ+1 24 20.8 23 23.8
λ+2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
† Power in MW , prices in $/MWh.
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power causes a different market outcome (see prices and demand levels). Because cheap
power is reduced, more power flows through line 2, resulting in less congestion in line 1.
GenCos surplus increases mainly by the higher prices at which GenCos 1 and 2 now sell; in
contrast, the loads surplus is slightly reduced. Although the net surplus increases, the social
welfare decreases because less congestion rents (welfare transfer from demands and GenCos
to the ISO) are collected. In addition, g1,1,1 sets a higher SR price of $5.84/MWh. This
price is composed by the SR marginal cost of g1,1,1 ($4/MWh) plus the opportunity cost
Table 3.3: Profits comparison in $/h. Competitive market.
Case A B C D
ΠG1 1,355 2,203.3 1,651.9 1,402.4
ΠG2 734.4 1,076.0 837.0 749.8
ΠG3 1,777.9 1,597.1 1,718.8 1,768.7
ΠR1 0.0 270.2 200.0 338.1
ΠR2 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.1
ΠR3 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.8
Π1 1,355 2,473.6 1,851.9 1,740.6
Π2 734.4 1,076.0 837.0 843.0
Π3 1,777.9 1,597.1 1,718.8 1,795.6
Congestion rents 4,800.0 4,176.8 4,600.0 4,769.3
GenCos’ surplus 3,867.5 4,876.5 4,207.8 3,921.1
Demands’ surplus 39,665.3 39,216.4 39,518.6 39,642.5
Social welfare 48,333.8 48,269.7 48,326.5 48,332.9
of $1.84/MWh. This opportunity cost is simply the difference between the corresponding
price at node 1 ($15.46/MWh) and the energy marginal cost ($13.61/MWh) of g1,1,1 –see
(3.64). Since the SR price is above the SR marginal cost of g1,1,1, this GenCo has a profit
of $270.2/h by providing spinning reserve.
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Case C. g1,1,1=750 MW and r1,1,1=100 MW
Let us now consider that g1,1,1, besides g1,1,1 = 750 MW, has also a maximum SR limit. If
r1,1,1 ∈ (77.92, 146.6), the inclusion of a SR limit will alter the energy market outcome
3.
Taking this into account, consider a SR limit of, say, 100 MW. In this case, g1,1,1 now
provides 650 MW for energy and 100 MW for SR. To satisfy the SR requirement, now
g2,1,2 provides 47.37 MW, and sets the SR market price at $6/MWh. The introduction of
the SR limit curbs the decrease (motivated from the interaction of the energy and reserve
markets) in generation of g1,1,1, which produces 650 MW rather than 603.3 MW. As more
–cheap– generation is used (in comparison to Case B), more congestion occurs in line 1;
however the market is better off as the welfare increases. Consequently, the incentive from
the SR market will impact less severely the energy market.
Case D. Market power in the SR market
In this case, GenCos can manipulate the SR market price; this is done by means of the
conjectured reserve-price function described in Definition 3.3. Assume that all GenCos
behave strategically (Cν=-0.05, ∀ ν). The market outcome is computed by including both
energy and SR limits for g1,1,1, as in Case C. The strategy for g1,1,1 is to shift power (100-83.1
MW) from the SR market to the energy market. Such an increase of generation makes g2,1,2
decrease its generation (leading to lower energy prices at nodes 1-3), and g3,1,4 increase its
generation. As more –cheap– power from g1,1,1 is produced, the transmission line 1 becomes
more congested, increasing the congestion rents by $169.3/h. The reduction of SR from
g1,1,1 is mainly compensated by g3,1,4, which leads a higher SR price ($8.1/MWh). On the
other hand, this manipulation in the SR market has been not profitable for g1,1,1. This
GenCo is now obtaining a higher profit from the SR market; nonetheless, this profit is not
3If a spinning reserve limit r1,1,1 ∈ [0, 77.92] MW is chosen, the energy market outcome will be as that
of Case A. This is because r1,1,1 would be lower than the SR level that g1,1,1 has available (750-672 MW).
Then the SR that g1,1,1 provides would be such a chosen SR limit. On the other hand, if a spinning reserve
limit r1,1,1 ∈ [146.68, ∞) is chosen, the energy market outcome will be as that of Case B. This is because
r1,1,1 will be higher than the optimal SR level of g1,1,1. Then the SR that g1,1,1 provides will be 146.68
MW.
Chapter 3. An Oligopolistic Model for Power Networks 48
enough to compensate the lost profit from the energy market4. The other GenCos have
seen a net profit increase.
3.3.2 Oligopolistic energy market
In this section, all generators are considered to compete à la Cournot in the energy market
(B−ν,i=0.0, ∀ ν, i), while the SR market remains competitive for all cases but Case D. The
interaction becomes more complex for the oligopolistic market, although the logic is similar
to the competitive case. The market outcomes comparison is presented in Tables 3.4 and
3.5.
Case A. No generation limits
In comparison to the competitive case, there is a reduction of generation from all GenCos
that jacks up the market prices. Due to higher energy prices, less demand is served; this
causes not only less congestion in the system5 but also a lower requirement of spinning
reserve (from 147.7 MW to 116.5 MW). Although GenCos produces less power, they earn
higher profits since they are charging much higher energy prices. The strategic behaviour
increases the GenCos surplus by 365%, while the demands surplus is reduced by 34%;
this represents a large welfare transfer from consumers to GenCos. In comparison to the
competitive case, the net welfare decreases from $48, 333.8/h to $46, 205.5/h.
On the other hand, as no generator is constrained by a maximum capacity, the SR
market does not affect the energy market outcome; then, by the complementarity principle,
µν,h,i=0, and there is no opportunity cost between producing and spinning. The SR price
is set again by g1,1,1 at η
∗=α1,1,1=$4/MWh.
4This is due to g1,1,1’s position in the SR market. This generator is the cheapest unit to provide SR,
and cannot supply all of it; hence, this generator is not the marginal unit for SR, and its strategies are
limited by the other GenCos strategies.
5The dual variable for the transmission line 1 decreases from $24/MWh to $9.8/MWh, and, conse-
quently, the congestion rents shrink by 58.8%.
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Table 3.4: Energy and spinning reserve interaction. Oligopolistic case†.
Case A B C D
g1,1,1 494.8 472.4 480 487.1
g3,1,2 379.2 394.9 389.6 384.6
g3,1,4 288.4 284.6 285.9 287.1
r1,1,1 116.2 77.6 70 62.8
r2,1,2 0.0 37.6 45.5 36.5
r3,1,4 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.5
ρ1 29.4 30.5 30.2 29.8
ρ2 31.4 32.1 31.8 31.6
ρ3 30.4 31.3 31.0 30.7
ρ4 35.3 35.1 35.2 35.3
ρ5 34.3 34.4 34.4 34.4
ρ6 36.3 35.9 36.0 36.2
d1 152.6 147.0 148.9 150.7
d2 242.8 239.4 240.5 241.6
d3 97.7 93.2 94.7 96.2
d4 123.0 124.0 123.7 123.4
d5 328.0 327.9 327.9 327.9
d6 218.1 220.2 219.5 218.8
z1 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0
z2 180.8 187.5 185.2 183.1
η∗ 4 6 6 7.8
λ+1 9.8 7.6 8.4 9.1
λ+2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
† Power in MW , prices in $/MWh.
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Case B. No SR limits and g1,1,1=550 MW
For this case, assume g1,1,1 has a maximum generation limit of, say, 550MW ; because of
this constraint, g1,1,1 will not be able to provide all the SR, as in Case A. Due to the
opportunity cost, g1,1,1 reduces generation (from 494.81 MW to 472.39 MW) in order to
provide a larger amount of SR (77.6 MW instead of 55.19 MW). Now, g2,1,2 provides the
remaining amount of SR (37.6 MW), and becomes the marginal unit for it, setting the SR
market price at $6/MWh. The SR price, η∗=$6/MWh, is composed by the SR marginal
cost of g1,1,1 (α1,1,1=$4/MWh) and the opportunity cost between energy and spinning
reserve ($2/MWh). This opportunity cost is not only defined by the difference between
Table 3.5: Profits comparison in $/h. Oligopolistic market.
Case A B C D
ΠG1 8,895.8 9,052.9 9,005.6 8,955.5
ΠG2 5,514.6 5,979.7 5,819.9 5,671.5
ΠG3 3,604.7 3,511.7 3,543.1 3,572.8
ΠR1 0.0 155.2 140.0 240.4
ΠR2 0.0 0.0 0.0 66.6
ΠR3 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.6
Π1 8,895.8 9,208.1 9,145.6 9,196.0
Π2 5,514.6 5,979.7 5,819.9 5,738.2
Π3 3,604.7 3,511.7 3,543.1 3,586.4
Congestion rents 1,973.2 1,533.9 1,682.9 1,823.0
GenCos’ surplus 18,015.2 18,544.5 18,368.7 18,199.9
Demands’ surplus 26,217.0 25,909.8 26,012.5 26,110.5
Social welfare 46,205.5 45,988.3 46,063.9 46,133.4
the locational price at node 2 and the marginal cost of g1,1,1 (like in the competitive case),
but also by the price that g1,1,1 sets upon its power sales at node 1 (δ1d1,1=$15.74/MWh)
–see (3.63). Generator g1,1,1 is producing less power than it would be in the case of an
energy-only market; such a reduction causes an increase of the energy prices at nodes 1-3.
This further increase in prices is due to the incentives from the SR market; nonetheless,
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this incentive now depends also upon the ability of g1,1,1 to influence the energy market.
Case C. g1,1,1=550 MW and r1,1,1=70 MW
Consider now that g1,1,1 has also a maximum SR limit of 70 MW. Due to this limit, g1,1,1
is constrained to provide 70 MW for SR, while its remaining capacity (480 MW) is used
for the energy market. The SR limit makes g1,1,1 increase its generation from 472.4 MW
(Case B) to 480 MW; this increase leads lower energy prices at nodes 1–3, but higher
prices at nodes 4–6. As more (cheap) power from g1,1,1 is used to supply the demands,
the transmission line 1 becomes more congested, increasing the congestion rents by 9.7%.
On the other hand, the SR price, from the point of view of g1,1,1, is now composed by
its SR marginal cost (α1,1,1=$4/MWh), the opportunity cost ($1.32/MWh), and the dual
variable of the SR limit (φ1,1,1=$0.67/MWh).
Case D. Market power in the SR market
Consider Case C of this section and assume now that all GenCos behave strategically in
the SR market (Cν=-0.05, ∀ ν). The strategies of g1,1,1 and g2,1,2 is to reduce the provision
of spinning reserve. Such reductions make g3,1,4 provide 16.5 MW of spinning reserve
at price of $7.82/MWh. For g1,1,1, the SR price is composed by its SR marginal cost
(α1,1,1=$4/MWh), the SR price manipulation ($3.14/MWh), and the opportunity cost
between the provision of energy and spinning reserve ($0.68/MWh). Such an opportunity
cost is reduced (from $1.32/MWh to $0.68/MWh) because g1,1,1 is shifting power from
the SR market to the energy market. As long as its strategic behaviour in the SR market
increases, the opportunity cost reduces to zero. Hence, at some point g1,1,1 will get the
energy market outcome from Case A (this is equivalent to have no limits in capacity and
spinning reserve) as its manipulation of the SR market will not have anymore an effect
on the energy market. That is, depending on its degree of strategic behaviour in the SR
market, the generation level of g1,1,1 can fall between 480 MW (competitive in the spinning
reserve market) and 494.81 MW (highly strategic in the SR market). This represents a
tradeoff between strategic behaviour in the SR market and the incentive of the opportunity
cost between the energy and spinning reserve markets.
Chapter 3. An Oligopolistic Model for Power Networks 52
3.3.3 Multi-period market
In another simulation, consider an extension for 24 trading periods of the test system above
described. The profile for all six demands is shown in Figure 3.2. This profile resembles
a classical daily pattern where there is a peak. The demands are defined with a reference
price of $20/MWh and a demand function slope (δi) of 0.2. Upper generation limits
are g1,1,1 =550 MW, g2,1,2=800 MW and g3,1,4=800 MW; while all generating units are
assumed to have up- and down-ramp limits of 50MW/h. Through all the cases, GenCos
behave strategically in both the energy and SR markets, with Cν,i=-0.05, B−ν,i=10, ∀ ν, i.
The main results are presented in Table 3.6. In the comparisons, only the means of the



























Figure 3.2: Demand profile at each node.
Case A. No ramp-rate limits
For the sake of comparison, a market outcome is obtained by relaxing the ramp-rate limits;
this is equivalent to have 24 independent and static market outcomes. The optimal solution
for the whole trading horizon is the set of all the static (local) optima. When ramp-rate
limits are neglected, generation units can be scheduled to any level from one period to
another, and, hence, any unit can avoid low prices before incurring generation losses.
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Table 3.6: Ramp-rate limits effect on the market outcome. Static vs. dynamic case†.
Case A B C
ρ1 22.09 22.14 22.89
ρ2 23.71 23.82 24.23
ρ3 22.90 22.98 23.56
ρ4 27.24 27.20 27.05
ρ5 26.43 26.36 26.38
ρ6 28.06 28.04 27.72
ΠG1 133,307.1 133,232.3 137,909.0
ΠG2 69,255.2 71,668.2 77,311.3
ΠG3 31,913.1 32,412.0 31,440.4
ΠR1 1,532.5 1,792.5 2,849.1
ΠR2 2,015.0 1,879.4 1,339.7
ΠR3 34.2 27.0 21.7
Π1 134,839.7 135,024.9 140,758.1
Π2 71,270.3 73,547.7 78,651.1
Π3 31,947.3 32,439.1 31,462.1
Congestion rents 41,697.0 40,507.8 33,520.5
Demands’ surplus 594,000.7 590,273.1 585,374.1
GenCos’ surplus 234,475.5 237,312.6 246,660.7
Social welfare 870,173.2 868,093.5 865,555.3
e1,1,1 12,605.3 12,499.0 12,000.0
e2,1,2 9,910.5 10,038.0 10,496.9
e3,1,4 5,592.4 5,558.4 5,443.6
† Power in MW , prices in $/MWh, energy in MWh and profits in $.
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Case B. Inclusion of ramp-rate limits
As every period is linked with the previous and subsequent ones, the optimal solution for
every period may not be the same as the static optimal from Case A –see Figure 3.3.
This fact becomes evident in the periods around the peak. For instance, the generation
of g2,1,2 becomes limited up and down by the ramp-rate limits. On one side, generation
levels will be lower (in comparison to those of Case A) for the up and peak periods (16-20),
leading to higher energy prices and higher profits. On the other side, generation levels
are higher for the down periods (21-24), leading to lower prices and profits. However, the
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Figure 3.3: GenCos profits. Multi-period cases.
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money collected from the up periods is higher than the money lost from the down periods;
consequently, g2,1,2 has a net increase in profit. The decrease in generation (in comparison
to those from Case A) in up and peak hours arises from inter-temporal constraints, not
from a market power exercise per se. As expected, misleading conclusions on market power
could be derived from an analysis built upon a static model.
In the case of g1,1,1, the ramp-rate limits make it produce less power throughout the
horizon and follow a different strategy. For the up periods, g1,1,1 has no changes in genera-
tion, and it sells the same amount of power at higher prices, earning higher profits. For the
down periods, g1,1,1 reduces generation in order to compensate the g2,1,2’s effect on prices,
selling less power to avoid lower prices. The result is that cheap power is substituted by
more expensive generation.
This logic is more vivid for g3,1,4; since this generator is the most expensive, changes
in its generation have a stronger impact on prices. In peak periods, as g3,1,4 finds it very
profitable to produce, it is at high generation levels. However, in subsequent periods the
demand becomes low and so do prices; then this generator cannot freely ramp down to
be scheduled at static optimal generation levels, and it has to produce at prices below its
marginal costs, incurring losses. Nonetheless, the high profits earned from peak periods
offset the losses from down periods, resulting in a net increase of profits for g3,1,4.
Furthermore, the change in generation also impacts on the SR level to be provided by
each GenCo. In periods 15-20, less demand, and, hence, less spinning reserve is required
(in comparison to Case A); the reduction in SR comes from g2,1,2 and g3,1,4. In periods
21-24, there is an increase in demand, and, thus, in SR; this increase is provided by g1,1,1.
There is also an extra shift of power to the spinning reserve; due to ramp-rate constraints,
g1,1,1 reduces generation, and it has now more capacity available for spinning reserve (this
generator has cheaper SR). Thus, g1,1,1 will substitute spinning reserves from g2,1,2, leading
to a lower SR price in these periods. In the remaining periods, there is no change in the
profile of the SR provision. This results in a net profit increase from spinning reserve for
g1,1,1, and a profit decrease for the other GenCos.
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Case C. e1,1,1=12000 MWh
Let us consider Case B but g1,1,1 is now limited by the maximum energy that it can provide
in the trading horizon. From Case B, the net energy supplied by g1,1,1 is 12499 MWh; to
see how the energy limit affects its strategies, assume an energy limit of, say, 12000 MWh.
Due to this constraint, g1,1,1 has to reduce throughout the horizon a net amount of 499
MWh. For periods 17-20, with the highest prices and also the most profitable ones, there
is no change in generation. For most of the remaining periods, the trend is to have a larger
reduction where both generation levels and prices are higher; a generation decrease where
prices are already high will lead to higher prices, and, hence, higher profits. The extra
available capacity of g1,1,1 is now used to provide spinning reserve; therefore, cheaper prices
(except for periods 17-20) for spinning reserve are obtained through the trading periods.
On the other hand, more expensive power from g2,1,2 has to be used to compensate the
reductions of g1,1,1, leading to higher prices at nodes 1-3 (except at periods 17-20); this is
followed by a decrease in generation by g3,1,4 in order to avoid sell power at a lower price.
The variation of nodal prices due to the inclusion of ramp-rate limits is depicted in
Figure 3.4; such a variation is computed as the difference between the nodal prices of
Cases A and B. When ramp-rate limits are not binding, there are no price changes; see
for instance, periods 1-14. Nonetheless, when they are binding, as in most of the on-peak
periods, ramp-rate constraints increase the nodal prices, meanwhile the nodal prices are
diminished in off-peak hours.
The inclusion of more constraints may lead to complicated interactions within the mar-
ket. Although more constraints are considered into the system, the GenCos profits become
higher; this counter-intuitive result comes from the fact that the cheapest generation is
which becomes more limited; hence, power from more expensive units is used, resulting in
higher prices and profits. The decrease of cheap power also causes less congestion in the
system. On the other hand, the inclusion of more constraints results in a decrease of the
social welfare.






































































Figure 3.4: Effect of ramping constraints on prices.
3.4 A 57-node System
In another simulation, the standard IEEE-based test power system of 57 nodes and 80
transmission lines [120] is considered for 24 trading periods. There are 7 GenCos partici-
pating in the energy and spinning reserve markets; their generation characteristics are listed
in Table B.8, Appendix B. All generation units are assumed to have linear cost functions
and ramp-rate limits of 40MW/h. The peak values for the time-varying demands are pre-
sented in Table B.9, Appendix B. GenCos 1 and 2 are considered to behave strategically
in both the energy and spinning reserve markets (B−ν,i=10, Cν=-0.05, ν = 1, 2, ∀i), while
the remaining GenCos are considered as a competitive fringe.
For this case study, a simulation has been also performed by using the solver PATH
under GAMS [118]. All the system and generation constraints are considered. The net
GenCos’ profits are given in Table 3.7.
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1 26,299.7 1,692.7 27,992.4
2 98,128.4 111.3 98,239.7
3 19,984.6 3,635.0 23,619.6
4 5,023.2 0.0 5,023.2
5 3,263.6 0.0 3,263.6
6 49,716.4 40.3 49,756.8
7 815.7 0.0 815.7
Besides GenCos 1 and 2, GenCos 3 and 6 earn high profits; this is because they have
cheap units and because the market prices, at which these GenCos sell power, is set above
their marginal cost. These high prices arise from the system interactions and the strategic
behaviour of GenCos 1 and 2 rather than by the GenCos 3 and 6 behaviour. In the reserve
market, GenCos 1, 2, 3 and 6 have profits since they are the cheapest units for spinning
reserves. The SR price through the trading periods is depicted in Figure 3.5. The SR
price varies accordingly to the demand levels; the more the demand and, thus, the SR





















Figure 3.5: Spinning reserve price over time.
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3.5 FTR Impact on Market Power
The introduction of hedging instruments, such as transmission rights, may add more room
for market power. Although extensive work has been carried out from an analytical point
of view, with two- and three-node systems, few works have studied this interaction for more
real systems. In [121], a methodology for screening exacerbation of market power due to
FTRs is presented. In a pool-like model, [22], the effect of FTRs on the generators strate-
gies is analyzed; in this model, two sets of GenCos are considered: competitive and Cournot
GenCos. All the competitive GenCos are modelled as a fringe, and its profit-maximization
problem is casted as a social welfare maximization. Then the first-order optimality con-
ditions of the competitive fringe are incorporated into the optimization problems of each
Cournot GenCo. In this way, Cournot participants foresee how competitive participants will
act, and how their actions can impact transmission prices. Thus, the profit-maximization
problem for each Cournot GenCo becomes a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Con-
straints (MPEC) [122], which is an inherently non-convex and a hard-to-solve problem.
An alternative model to ease the problem is to include smooth functions for modelling the
manipulation of the transmission prices. In this way, the problem can be treated as be-
ing convex, and modelled as a MLCP [47,123] which leads to a computationally tractable
model.
Let us now consider that GenCos behave in a more sophisticated manner, such that
they anticipate how arbitrage is affected by their strategies. This can be done by incorpo-
rating the equilibrium conditions –(3.55) and (3.56)– of arbitrage into each GenCo problem.
Because the variables related to arbitrage are unrestricted, the corresponding equilibrium
conditions are equalities. Thus, the equilibrium conditions of arbitrage are simply extra
linear constraints, and the GenCos profit-maximization problem remains as convex. In
addition, the arbitrage and the price at the slack node become endogenous in each GenCo
problem, consequently, they are now denoted by aν,i and ρν,s, respectively. This is similar
to what has been done for a pool model in [15].
Similar to the conjectures functions described in §3.1, a conjectured transmission-price
response function can be introduced in order to model how GenCos can influence the








–see Expression (3.38). Since the net transmission service required by ν, at node
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i, is dν,i −
∑
h gν,h,i, the power injection at i can be decomposed as













where the first term is the power under control of ν, while the second term is the power of
the other GenCos.
Definition 3.5 (Conjectured transmission-price function) A conjectured transmission-

















Aν,i, ∀i ∈ I, (3.66)
where ων,i and ω
∗
i are the congestion price seen by ν at i, and the transmission price at
equilibrium, respectively. Aν,i is the conjectured transmission-price response parameter for
ν. For the standard competitive outcome, Aν,i ≡ 0. The transmission-price function allows
one to model the ability of ν to influence the transmission prices; i.e., to include how ν
expects the transmission prices vary if ν modifies the power injection at node i.
3.5.1 GenCo problem
Let us consider a one-period market for energy and transmission where participants hold
a portfolio of FTRs –which has been previously allocated. Besides the profit from the
energy market, the FTR payoff represents another money stream. As FTRs can be defined
by an amount of power τν,m,ℓ, and the injection (m) and withdrawal (ℓ) nodes, the payoff
associated with such an FTR is then τν,m,ℓ(ρν,ℓ− ρν,m). The price ρν,i seen by GenCo ν, at
node i, is
ρν,i =







Thus, the profit-maximization problem for GenCo ν (without taking into account the
cost incurred from acquiring the FTRs) is,






















gν,h,j = 0, (3.69)
gν,h,i − gν,h,i ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, (3.70)
ρν,i − ρν,s − ων,i = 0, ∀i ∈ I, (3.71)
∑
i
aν,i = 0, (3.72)
dν,i, gν,h,i,≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi, (3.73)
The conjectured supply and transmission-response functions, (in Definitions 3.2 and
3.5) are used to substitute d−ν,i and ων,i, respectively, into the problem (3.68)–(3.73). The










































gν,h,i, dν,i, µν,h,i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi,
ρν,s, aν,i, ϑν , λν,i, ϕν free ∀i ∈ I.
Based on this Lagrangian, the equilibrium conditions for GenCo ν are derived,
• For dν,i, ∀i ∈ I:
0 ≥
























− ϑν + Aν,iλν,i ⊥ dν,i ≥ 0 (3.75)
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• For gν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi:
0 ≥− βν,h,i − 2γν,h,igν,h,i +
[






− Aν,iλν,i − µν,h,i ⊥ gν,h,i ≥ 0 (3.76)
• For µν,h,i, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ Hi:
0 ≥gν,h,i − gν,h,i ⊥ µν,h,i ≥ 0 (3.77)

























λν,i; ρν,s free (3.79)







gν,h,j; ϑν free (3.80)
• For λν,i, ∀i ∈ I:
0 =ρν,i − ρν,s − ων,i; λν,i free (3.81)




aν,i; aν,i free (3.82)
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3.5.2 ISO problem
Since the arbitrage conditions have been introduced into the GenCos’ problem, such con-
ditions do not have to be explicitly modelled into the ISO problem anymore. The ISO
problem is now to efficiently allocate the scarce transmission among GenCos. Recalling the















− zk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ K, (3.84)
pi free, ∀i ∈ I. (3.85)
The derivation of the corresponding equilibrium conditions are straightforward; they
are




si,kpi − zk ⊥ λ
+
k ≥ 0 (3.86)




si,kpi − zk ⊥ λ
−
k ≥ 0 (3.87)
• For pi, ∀i ∈ I:







k ); pi free (3.88)
3.5.3 Market clearing conditions
In addition to match demand and supply of energy and transmission, market clearing
conditions characterize the market prices for such services. The first condition is for the
energy market. This condition ensures that, under equilibrium, the nodal prices are equal
to the prices seen by each GenCo,
ρ∗i = ρoi − δi
(
dν,i + d−ν,i + aν,i
)
, i ∈ I, ν ∈ V. (3.89)
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A second condition is that the power balance at each node needs to be preserved,






gf,h,i), ∀i ∈ I, ν ∈ V. (3.90)
Notice that at equilibrium: ων,i = ω
∗
i , ∀ν, i. Although arbitrage and the slack-node
price are considered endogenous within each GenCo problem, at equilibrium, they will be
the same for all GenCos, i.e., af,i = aν,i and ρf,s = ρν,s, ∀f 6= ν.
Likewise the model in §3.2, the complementarity conditions of all market participants
together with the market clearing conditions define a market equilibrium problem. The
resulting complementarity model has been solved with PATH under GAMS [118].
3.5.4 An illustrative example
Let us consider the two-zone system shown in Figure 3.6. Assume that suppliers at every
zone can be represented by a sole GenCo with unlimited capacity (otherwise specified),
and denoted by g1,1 and g2,2, respectively. They have energy marginal costs of $15/MWh
and $14/MWh, respectively. Demands are given by the affine functions ρ1=150− 0.15d1
and ρ2=149− 0.15d2. The transmission link, z1, between zones is modelled as lossless and





Figure 3.6: A two-zone system.
Consider a static market where g1,1 behaves in a Cournot fashion (B−1,i = 0) and
g2,2 behaves competitively (B−2,i → ∞). Furthermore, assume that g1,1 can influence the
transmission prices (A1,i = 0.5, i = {1, 2}). With this market configuration, the price
at zone 2 tends to be more competitive (ρ2 → $14 as B−2,i → ∞ ), and g2,2 becomes an
exporter. Hence, the transmission link will become congested (λ−1 > 0) as cheap power
flows from zone 2 to zone 1. Here, three cases are considered under different assumptions
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of FTR ownership. In all three cases, the outcomes of g2,2 do not vary; different market
outcomes will occur only if the strategy g1,1 changes. Results of these simulations are
presented in Table 3.8.
Case A: No FTRs
Let us consider that g1,1 holds an FTR of, say, 75 MW from zone 2 to zone 1 (τ1,2,1), but g1,1
does not include such an FTR into its profit maximization problem; i.e, g1,1 considers the







after the energy market is cleared. Due to strategic behaviour of g1,1, the market price at
its zone is $71.32/MWh; while the congestion cost is $57.3/MWh. The market operator
collects $5, 732.65/h from congestion; from this surplus, $4, 299.5/h are used to honor the
τ1,2,1 payoff to g1,1.
Case B: Inclusion of τ1,2,1
For this case, assume that g1,1 takes into account the FTR ownership within its profit-
maximization problem. The result is a further decrease in production (393.87 MW) with
an increase in its zone price, and, therefore, an increase in congestion (from $57.32/MWh
to $61.91MWh). Its net profit is now $23, 994.3/h by selling energy, plus $4, 643.8/h from
the FTR payoff. By including the FTR into its strategy, g1,1,1 has increased the τ1,2,1 payoff
from $4, 299.5/h to $4, 643.8/h. Hence, the ownership of τ1,2,1 has exacerbated the market
power of g1,1, shrinking the social welfare. For a similar system configuration, Joskow et
al., [59], have analytically reached this conclusion.
Case C: Inclusion of τ1,1,2
Let us now consider that g1,1 holds an FTR in the opposite direction; i.e., τ1,1,2 = 75 MW.
This FTR, going from zone 1 to zone 2, has a negative payoff, resulting in a liability for
the holder. Consequently, τ1,2,1 is now an obligation rather than a right. The best strategy
for g1,1 is to increase production in order to reduce the price of its zone, and, thus, reduce
the congestion cost (from $57.3/MWh to $55.3/MWh). The liability for holding τ1,1,2
decreases from $4, 299.5 to $4153.12. In this case, the ownership of τ1,1,2 mitigates the
market power of g1,1 , increasing the social welfare of the market.
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Case D: Pure monopoly
Alternatively, all cases can be solved analytically to get the generation level and price at
zone 1 in terms of the allocated amount of τ1,2,1.
Given the system configuration, it is straightforward to state the profit-maximization
problem of g1,1 for an energy-only market with the ownership τ1,2,1; this is as follows:
max
g1,1
Π1 = ρ1,1g1,1 − β1,1g1,1 + τ1,2,1(ρ1,1 − ρ
∗
2), (3.91)
where ρ1,1 = 150 − 0.15d1 is the inverse demand function, and ρ
∗
2 = $14/MWh is the
Table 3.8: Market outcomes comparison with different FTR ownerships‡.
Case A B C D
A1,i, i = {1, 2} 0.5 0.5 0.5 →∞
τ1,2,1 0.0 75 -75 75
g1,1 424.5 393.8 437.5 362.5
g2,2 1,000.0 1,000.0 1,000.0 1,000.0
d1 524.5 493.8 537.5 462.5
d2 900.0 900.0 900.0 900.0
z1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
ρ∗1 71.3 75.9 69.3 80.6
ρ∗2 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0
λ1 57.3 61.9 55.3 66.6
ΠG1 23,910.0 23,994.3 23,789.0 23,789.0
ΠF1 4,299.5 4,643.8 -4,153.1 4,996.8
Π1 28,209.5 28,638.1 19,635.9 28,785.8
Π2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Congestion Rents 5,732.6 6,191.8 5,537.5 6,850.0
GenCos’ surplus 23,910.0 23,994.3 23,789.0 23,789.0
Loads’ surplus 81,381.5 79,043.4 82,417.7 76,792.7
Social welfare 111,024.1 109,229.5 111,744.3 107,431.7
‡ Power in MW , prices in $/MWh, any other in $/h.
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competitive price at zone 2. Because g2,2 is cheaper and behaves competitively, the system
will be congested from zone 2 to zone 1; hence, z1 will be binding. As long as this congestion
pattern is acknowledged by g1,1, this GenCo will see a residual demand of d1 − 100 MW.
Thus, simplifying (3.91) one gets
max
g1,1
Π1 = 120− 0.15g
2
1,1 + τ1,2,1(121− 0.15g1,1). (3.92)
By the first optimality conditions, g∗1,1 = 400 − 0.5τ1,2,1 MW and ρ
∗
1 = 75 + 0.075τ1,2,1
$/MWh. As it can be seen, the Case B falls between the monopoly without FTRs (g∗1,1 =
400 MW, ρ∗1 = $75/MWh) and the perfect monopoly with τ1,2,1 = 75 MW (g
∗
1,1 = 362.5
MW, ρ∗1 = $80.62/MWh). With the proposed computable model, the market outcome
from Case D can be obtained by using larger values of A1,i ∀ i.
3.5.5 A 118-node system
In this simulation, the standard IEEE-based test power system of 118 nodes and 186
transmission lines [120] is used to represent the transmission system. For this case, 54
generating units are considered and organized in 15 GenCos. Furthermore, GenCos hold
portfolios of FTRs from an ex ante allocation process. Generation, demand and FTR data
are listed in §B.4, Appendix B.
For a case study, GenCos 1 and 2 are considered to behave à la Cournot in the energy
market, while they are also able to alter the transmission prices (Aν,i = 0.01, ν = {1, 2}, ∀i).
The remaining GenCos are modelled as a competitive fringe. For this system, two cases
are analyzed. In Case A, although GenCos hold FTRs, such FTRs are no included in the
GenCos strategies. In this way, the FTR payoffs are modelled as exogenous to the GenCos
profit-maximization problem. In contrast, for Case B, the FTR payoffs are considered
endogenous within the GenCo profit optimization problems, as derived supra in §3.5.1.
When GenCos recognize the extra room that FTRs can provide for exercising mar-
ket power, the peak prices (both lower and upper) are increased, making larger the price
differences throughout the network –see Figure 3.7. For instance, the price at node 69,
which is the second lowest one, decreases from $21.33/MWh to $20.27/MWh; on the
other hand, the price at node 75, which is the highest one, increases from $34.08/MWh
to $36.55/MWh. Consequently, those FTRs defined between such extreme prices be-
come more valuable. Consider, for instance, τ1,69,75; for Case A, this FTR has a value
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of nodal prices. 118-node system.
of 34.08−21.33 = 12.75$/MWh; meanwhile, for Case B, its value becomes 36.55−20.27 =
16.28$/MWh. By a further manipulation of the market, this FTR is $3.53/MWh more
valuable.
In order to manipulate the market prices, GenCos have to modify their generation
schedules. GenCo 1, placed at node 69, actually increases its generation from 742.9 MW
to 820 MW (full capacity) in order to decrease the corresponding nodal price6. Due to this
kind of adjustments, the generation schedules may change when FTRs are included. The
most vivid case is the generation unit of GenCo 8, which is placed at node 55. For Case
A, this unit produces 104.2 MW; nonetheless, when FTRs are considered, this generation
unit is not scheduled anymore. The comparison of generation schedules for both cases is
given in Table 3.9.
6At first glance, this increase in generation might not be seen as an exercise of market power, as the
traditional exercise of market power is based upon a withholding of capacity. This counter-intuitive way
to exercise market power is due to inherent interdependencies among suppliers through the transmission
network [22].
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Table 3.9: Comparison of generation schedules in MW.
ν h i Case A Case B
1 1 49 344.6 400.0
1 1 59 334.7 323.1
1 1 65 471.4 473.4
1 1 69 742.9 820.0
1 1 89 700.0 700.0
2 1 10 300.1 300.1
2 1 25 196.6 192.6
2 1 26 299.9 294.2
2 1 61 270.9 311.7
2 1 66 274.7 331.4
2 1 80 675.0 675.0
2 1 100 350.0 350.0
3 1 4 220.0 220.0
3 1 6 200.0 200.0
4 1 15 200.0 200.0
4 1 18 200.0 200.0
5 1 31 90.6 111.6
6 1 32 200.0 200.0
6 1 34 200.0 200.0
7 1 85 200.0 12.9
8 1 55 104.2 0.0
8 1 62 200.0 200.0
9 1 56 200.0 200.0
11 1 77 152.8 200.0
14 1 105 200.0 200.0
14 1 110 200.0 200.0
Chapter 3. An Oligopolistic Model for Power Networks 70
As a result of the inclusion of FTRs into the profit-maximization problems, GenCos 1
and 2 have a profit increase not only from the FTR payoffs, but also from participating in
the energy market –see Table 3.10. While some of the remaining GenCos (3, 5, 7, 8, 11,
12, 13 and 14) are better off for the strategic behaviour of GenCo 1 and 2, other GenCos
(4, 6 and 9) have their profits decreased. Which (competitive) GenCos are better off or
worsened depends basically upon the system configuration and the generation units costs.
Table 3.10: Comparison of GenCos profits in $/h.








1 32,123.4 3,463.7 35,587.1 32,165.1 4,457.9 36,623.0
2 24,086.8 2,504.8 26,591.6 24,330.1 3,264.3 27,594.5
3 445.9 0.0 445.9 446.7 0.0 446.7
4 270.4 301.1 571.5 215.3 259.7 475.0
5 0.0 959.4 959.4 0.0 1,192.5 1,192.5
6 396.9 71.8 468.7 348.4 69.8 418.3
7 9.6 502.6 512.3 0.0 643.2 643.2
8 53.9 301.6 355.5 140.6 446.8 587.4
9 191.5 102.2 293.7 167.5 107.0 274.5
11 0.0 515.9 515.9 15.7 660.6 676.3
12 0.0 13.9 13.9 0.0 17.8 17.8
13 0.0 278.3 278.3 0.0 356.1 356.1
14 953.4 392.2 1,345.6 915.4 471.7 1,387.2
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter, an equilibrium model to analyze imperfect competition in an integrated
market for energy and spinning reserve has been presented. By including temporal con-
straints, a dynamic model is analyzed. It is also considered that GenCos can influence the
prices of energy, transmission and spinning reserve.
The integration of different goods in one market creates complex interactions and in-
terdependencies among suppliers resources due to system constraints. If such interactions
and constraints are not taken into account, misleading conclusions of market power can be
obtained. With the proposed model, one attempts to add more realism to the modelling
and analysis of market power in electricity markets.
The proposed MLCP is obtained by gathering the KKT conditions of the optimization
problem for each market participant –GenCos and ISO– and the market clearing condi-
tions. One of the advantages of using a linear-complementarity framework, for modelling
imperfect competition, is the convexity nature of the equilibrium problem, and its potential
applicability for large power systems.
Based upon optimality conditions, a general expression of the opportunity cost between
energy and spinning reserve markets has been derived. This derivation allows one to identify
the components of the opportunity cost between generating and spinning within a range
of strategies, going from the Cournot case to the competitive one, and also to identify
the impact of manipulation on the spinning reserve market. Within this model, the effect
of financial transmission rights allocation upon GenCos incentives have been considered;
moreover, complex strategies for GenCos (with a set of generators and a portfolio of FTRs)
can be easily included.
It has been shown that even a competitive spinning reserve market may have an effect on
the energy market efficiency. For instance, when a capacity-limited generation unit procures
both energy and spinning reserve, such a unit shifts power from the energy market to the
spinning reserve market. Therefore, more expensive energy has to be used, with a decrease
of the social welfare. However, if this unit attempts to increase the SR price, it has to
reduce its SR capacity. This fact can be an opposite incentive to that from the opportunity
cost, since now this unit would have more capacity available for the energy market.
Due to the inherent characteristics of power systems, oligopoly models are currently
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envisioned as a proper modelling framework. However, it is recognized that, they are
not enough to address all the concerns of imperfect competition in the power sector [
32, 124]. So far, due to its nice numerical properties, equilibrium models based upon
conjectures functions have arisen as a practical alternative to analyze imperfect competition
in electricity markets [32].
One drawback could seem to be the computation of the conjectured parameters as they
are exogenous factors to the oligopoly models, and are not directly observed in the markets.
However, it has been shown that the conjectures parameters can be either obtained from
market data or can be calibrated to replicate market outcomes [15,29,50,111]. Moreover, the
conjecture-based models have the flexibility to analyze different settings by parametrically
varying the conjectures.
Chapter 4
Exacerbation of Market Power due to
FTR Ownership
In this chapter, a methodology is proposed for taking into account potential exacerbation
of market power due to financial transmission rights allocations. Hedging Position Ratios
(HPRs) are computed for FTR bids. These ratios quantify the relationship between the
positions of an FTR bidder in the energy market, and in the transmission rights allocation
(based on the transmission rights bids). They are used to identify the potential gambling
positions from the transmission rights bidders and, therefore, to prioritize critical positions
in the auction. The transmission-right auction is modelled as a quadratic programming
problem with a DC-network approximation. The methodology is illustrated by a three-node
system, and then extended to larger systems.
This chapter is organized as follows. The proposed scheme for the screening and mitiga-
tion of exacerbated market power due to an FTR allocation is presented in §4.1. Numerical
results are presented in §4.2. Final remarks close the chapter in §4.3.
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4.1 Proposed Methodology
4.1.1 A market for FTRs
A transmission-right market can provide a way to determine an allocation of FTRs and their
respective prices. The participants bid their willingness to trade FTRs. As an outcome,
the auction allocates the set of feasible FTRs. The objective of the market is twofold: (i) to
provide a means so that participants can access FTRs; and (ii) to maximize the revenues
from the FTR trading. An FTR market can be modelled similar to an energy auction,
maximizing surplus while maintaining the network feasibility for the set of awarded FTRs;
however, it does not represent an actual energy transaction.
For a power system, where the set of nodes is denoted by I and |I| stands for its
cardinality, an FTR can be modelled with a variable τℓ for the real power to be contracted,
and an incidence vector ξℓ ∈ ℜ
|I| for injections/withdrawals of real power. The elements
of ξℓ are factors (in per unit) that describe how an FTR is distributed among the network
nodes. Thus, every FTR can be modelled with either a pair or a cluster of nodes for the
source and sink.
In the proposed model, FTRs are defined with two nodes, one for injection (source) and
the other for withdrawal (sink). Let us consider a DC-model approach for an FTR auction.
The set F of all FTRs represents the net power injection into the system; thus, the nodal





where G stands for the susceptance matrix and δ is the vector of nodal angles [125]. The
set F can have three kinds of FTRs [126]: (i) the subset Ff which contains fixed FTRs;
these FTRs are not traded in the auction but they must be included to consider their effect;
(ii) Fp which contains FTRs to be purchased; and (iii) Ks that contains FTRs to be sold,
i.e.,














Chapter 4. Exacerbation of Market Power due to FTR Ownership 75
In addition, the feasible values of the FTRs are defined as,
0 ≤ τℓ ≤ τ ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ F , (4.4)
where τ ℓ denotes the maximum value of the ℓ-th FTR. Such a maximum value is estimated
by the bidders based upon their requirements of hedging, and submitted as a part of their
bid to the ISO.










Hδ ≤ z, (4.7)
0 ≤ τℓ ≤ τ ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ F . (4.8)
where fℓ(τℓ) stands for the concave benefit function for the ℓ-th FTR. This benefit function
is estimated by bidders according to their hedging needs, and represents the bidder willing-
ness to acquire such FTRs. Equation (4.7) stands for the real power-flow transmission-line
limits; H is the reactance matrix of the transmission lines [125]; and z denotes the vector
of maximum real power flows on the transmission lines. The solution to the problem (4.5)–
(4.8) gives the optimal FTR allocation. The dual variables related to (4.6) yield the nodal
prices; since FTRs are defined between two locations, the price for every FTR is given by
the price difference between trading locations.
4.1.2 Transmission usage factors for market participants
Since the sensitivity factors are dependent on the slack-node choice, and quantify incre-
mental changes, they may not be used to quantify the net utilization of the network by
participants. Different methods to compute the transmission usage by market participants
have been proposed, such as Generalized Distribution Factors (GDFs) [127], a proportion-
ality method [128] and the tracing method [129]. Due to the closeness with the sensitivity
factors, GDFs are used in this chapter. For details of the derivation of such factors, please
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refer to Definition A.3, Appendix A. The sound feature of these factors is their indepen-
dence of the slack-node choice which yields no conflict of interest; and secondly, they are
based upon an actual operation point of the power system.
Given a market outcome, the vector of power flows z ∈ R|K|, scheduled generations
g ∈ R|I| and loads d ∈ R|I| are taken to compute the GDFs. By Definition A.3, the usage
factor, ϕk,i, of the k-th transmission line, by a market participant placed at node i, is given
by
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, for suppliers,
〈 sij , d 〉−zk
〈e , d 〉
, for loads.
(4.10)
4.1.3 Transmission usage factors for FTRs
As an FTR τℓ is defined by a point-to-point transaction, by Definition A.2 , the transmission
usage factors for ℓ-th FTR is given by the power transfer distribution factors ̺k,ℓ.
4.1.4 Hedging position ratios
Once the distribution factors have been computed, the power capacity that market partic-
ipants are using of each transmission line can be easily obtained. For a market participant
placed at node i, with a power injection pi, the power that is being sent through the trans-
mission line k is piϕk,i. Similarly, for an FTR bid τℓ, the power that this FTR would send
through the transmission line k is τ ℓ̺k,ℓ. The former value is a metric of the size of the
exposure, while the latter is a metric of the size of the hedge. The proportion between
the position taken in the hedge and the position in the exposure will be called Hedging
Position Ratio (HPR), and denoted by φk,ℓ.
For a market participant placed at node i and submitting a bid for τ ℓ, its HPR for line
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The HPR contains two factors; the first one is pi/τ ℓ which is the ratio of the power traded
in the market and the power bid for hedging; this ratio is independent of the transmission
line. If pi < τ ℓ , then pi/τ ℓ < 1; hence, the FTR bid is implicitly penalized since the bidder
is hedging more power than the bidder is actually transacting in the market. On the other
hand, if pi > τ ℓ, then pi/τ ℓ > 1; such an FTR bid is implicitly encouraged. This factor,
thus, gets the market participants to bid the amount of power they have been actually
transacting in the energy market. The second factor, ϕk,i/̺k,ℓ, is more exogenous since it
depends not only upon the participant’s bid but also upon the network configuration, the
participant’s location and even upon the position of the other participants.
Because some power flows of the FTR bids can be opposite to those flows in the energy
market, their corresponding HPRs do not represent an actual hedge, and, thus, they are
left out, i.e., φk,ℓ = 0 |φk,ℓ < 0.
Afterwards, the HPRs are normalized in every transmission line in order to evenly take







, ∀k ∈ K. (4.12)
The net HPR in the system for a market participant, biding for τℓ, is then computed




φk,ℓ ∀ℓ ∈ F . (4.13)






, ∀ℓ ∈ F . (4.14)
Notice that φℓ ∈ [0, 1] , ∀ ℓ ∈ F . The HPRs comprise the market outcome, the network
conditions and the participants’ position in the market; hence, they may be used to screen
potential gambling positions by FTR bidders. As HPRs quantify the level of hedging
that FTRs provide to their potential holders, the lower the HPR value (φℓ), the more the
gambling position a market participant may have with τℓ.
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4.1.5 Modified auction for FTRs
In order to detect any gambling position, it is required to analyze the HPRs for the historic
market outcomes; the HPR analysis can be grouped into different periods such as on-peak
and off-peak hours. An alternative, for instance, is to weight the FTR bids, τ , based on
the mean value of the HPRs from historic market outcomes (say, the previous month for a









Hδ ≤ z, (4.17)
0 ≤ τℓ ≤ φℓ τ ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ F . (4.18)
In (4.18), the bids are proportionally weighted to the actual position that bidders have
historically had in the market. Thus, market participants with low HPRs will have their
maximum quantity for FTRs reduced. Since φℓ ≥ 0, this scheme may still award a portion
of strategic FTRs (although in smaller amounts) to participants with gambling positions.
A stronger prioritization is to introduce a threshold HPR, φ̂, such that the ℓ-th FTR bid
is accepted if φℓ ≥ φ̂; otherwise, the bid is accepted as given. Then a challenge would be
to identify which value is high enough for this threshold.
4.2 Numerical Examples
4.2.1 A three-node system
The methodology is firstly illustrated by means of a three-node system, which is shown
in Figure 4.1. It is assumed that both suppliers G1 and G2 have unlimited capacity and
marginal costs of $15/MWh and $20/MWh, respectively; there is a price-responsive con-
sumer at node 3 with a demand function p3 = 30 − 0.5ρ3. Furthermore, assume that G1
behaves competitively, while G2 is a price-maker. The network is modelled as lossless and
with equal transmission lines’ reactance; the transmission limit on line 1-2 is 4MW , while
the limits for the others are large enough to be disregarded. For a market outcome, pi and
ρi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the net power injection (generation/demand) and the locational







Figure 4.1: Three-node power system.
marginal prices, respectively; µ12 stands for the congestion multiplier of transmission line
1-2, while 4µ12 is the congestion rent.
In this work, unlike [59], a point-to-point-based rights approach is analyzed. In order
to show the incidence of FTR ownership by the price-maker supplier, only the case where
G2 is awarded with an FTR going from node 1 to node 2 (τ1) is analyzed. The market
outcomes under different strategies G2 are shown in Table 4.1 for τ1 ∈ [ 0, 4.625 ]; the
superscripts (∗), (m) and (f) stand for the competitive market, market power with no FTR
ownership and market power with τ1, respectively. Π
G, ΠF and ΠG+F denote the profit
by selling energy, by holding an FTR, and by both selling energy and holding and FTR,
respectively.
Under competitive conditions, and with no transmission constraints, generator G1 sup-
plies all the demand; however, the transmission constraint in line 1-2 restraints the gen-
eration at node 1 and, thus, more expensive generation from G2 has to be produced to
serve the demand. Due to the system configuration, it can be seen that G1 and G2 are
complements. In this case, G2 produces a counterflow for G1 which decreases congestion
in line 1-2. An increase in p2 allows an increase in p1; hence, both generators have to be
scheduled to obtain the optimal outcome. For the constrained case, the demand is 21.25
MW, while the congestion rent is $30/h. The prices at nodes 1 and 2 equal the marginal
cost of G1 and G2, respectively, while the price at node 3 is (ρ1 + ρ2)/2; therefore, G2 has
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no profit by selling energy. On the other hand, if G2 holds an FTR, τ1, its payoff is the
nodal price difference (ρ2 − ρ1) times the FTR capacity.
Under monopoly conditions, the market power exercised by G2 (by withholding capac-
ity) worsens the market outcome; the larger the withheld capacity ∆pm2 , the lower the
demand level, the higher the nodal prices ρ2 and ρ3, the higher the congestion cost, and the
larger the G2’s profit Π










economics establishes1. By their complementary effect, a reduction in p2 is followed by a
Table 4.1: Market outcomes comparison†
.
(∗) (m) (f)
ρ1 15 15 15
ρ2 20 38.50 38.50 +4 τ1
ρ3 17.50 26.75 26.75 +2 τ1
p1 16.62 14.31 14.31 -.5 τ1
p2 4.62 2.31 2.31 -.5 τ1
p3 21.25 16.62 16.62 - τ1
µ12 7.50 35.25 35.25 + 6τ1
4µ12 30 141 141+24 τ1
ΠG 0.0 42.78 42.78 - 2 τ
2
1
ΠF 5 τ1 0.0 23.5τ1 + 4τ
2
1
ΠG+F 5 τ1 42.78 42.78+ 23.5 τ1 + 2 τ
2
1
† Prices in $/MWh, power in MW and profits in $/h.
1This result comes from the fact that with a linear demand, the marginal revenue curve (for monopolistic
pricing) is twice as steep as the demand curve (for competitive pricing); hence, the marginal revenue curve
hits the marginal cost curve at half the value of the demand curve.
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reduction in p1. On the other hand, as a result of a higher price at node 3, the demand
level is reduced to 16.62 MW, and the congestion rent goes up to $141/h.
Furthermore, if G2 has also been awarded with an FTR, say, τ1, its market power can
be exacerbated; now G2 can increase its profit further than in the pure monopolistic case
since its profit is composed not only by energy sold, but also by the revenue from holding an
FTR. Thus, by increasing its withheld amount by ∆pf2 , beyond the pure monopolistic level,
G2 can increase its net profit by ∆Π
f –see Figure 4.2. As expected, the extra withheld
output to maximize the profit of G2 depends upon the FTR amount, as shown in Figures
4.3 and 4.4. With no FTR ownership (the initial point τ1 = 0), the optimal strategy of G2
is the output under pure monopolistic behaviour –see second column of Table 4.1. As long
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Figure 4.2: G2’s profit with and without τ1 = 1.4 MW.
as the awarded FTR increases, the generation level p2 (to maximize G2’s profit) is lower,
the price at node 2 is higher, and hence, the demand level is lower. This trade-off occurs
up to τ1 = 4.625MW ; beyond this value, G2’s optimal strategy is a generation of zero. The
path of this optimal generation output is traced within Figure 4.4. With an awarded FTR
of 6 MW, G2 is able to extract all the congestion rent of $252/h.
Consider now the pure monopolistic case; with this system configuration there are three
profitable FTRs: (i) from node 1 to node 3: ℓ = 1; (ii) from node 1 to node 2: ℓ = 2;
and (iii) from node 3 to node 2: ℓ = 3. Any of these FTRs can exacerbate the market
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Figure 4.3: G2’s optimal strategy for different values of τ1.
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Figure 4.4: Effect of an FTR ownership on G2’s strategies.
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power of G2. Let us study these FTRs as if they were bid by either G1 or G2 . It is
expected that G2 bids for an FTR amount which makes G2 maximize its profit. In the
standard FTR market, suppliers can bid for any quantity they are willing to hold; but in
the proposed methodology, if they bid for a quantity greater than the value of power they
have historically sold in the market, their bids are implicitly penalized in the HPRs –see
Equation (4.11). For this example, the transmission usage by participants are shown in
Figures 4.5 and 4.6, and the HPRs are summarized in Table 4.2.
G1
G2
Node 1 Node 1
Node 2 Node 2













Node 3 Node 3
Figure 4.5: Generalized generation distribution factors for suppliers.
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Figure 4.6: Power transfer distribution factors for different FTRs.
The HPRs identify the low-hedging positions that G2 would have with any of the FTRs;
for instance, the HPR corresponding to τ1 is 7.7%, showing its low level of hedging. Con-
sequently, the maximum value of τ1 that G2 could hold is 0.46MW (against 6MW that
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Table 4.2: HPRs for different FTR bids.
bidder ℓ Source Sink φℓ τ ℓ
i j (p.u.) (MW )
G1 1 1 3 1.00 14.31
G2 1 1 3 0.17 12
G1 2 1 2 0.60 14.31
G2 2 1 2 0.07 6
G1 3 3 2 0.40 14.31
G2 3 3 2 0.00 12
G2 needs to extract all the congestion rents). In the case of τ3, its HPR results in a zero
hedging level; as can be seen, this result comes from the fact that G2 is bidding for an FTR
which is not related to its actual position in the market. Moreover, as can be expected, G1
would have the highest HPR value (100%) if it bid for τ1, since G1 is actually looking for
hedging its position in the market.
4.2.2 Larger systems
Let us apply the above methodology to a five-node system; the test system is described
in Appendix B. It follows the idea of having loads with expensive local generation, and
cheaper generation in other areas. This illustrative power system has been used in different
FTR literature of PJM, see for instance [130].
Based on nodal prices, it can be seen that different FTRs can be profitable, as shown
in Table 4.3. On one hand, by market simulations, it is seen that G4 may exercise market
power. Consider, for instance, that G4 holds an FTR of, say, 120 MW between nodes 2
and 4 (denoted as τ2→4). The specific profit curves, shown in Figure 4.7, break down when
G4’s bid reaches the competitive level p
∗; for higher values, there is no strategic behaviour
anymore and the profit of G4 is constant since G4 is scheduled to the competitive output.
If G4 holds any of those profitable FTRs, its market power is exacerbated. Therefore,
the FTR allocation process should take into account its gambling position. For this case
study, consider that only market participants can bid for buying FTRs; their bids, with
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Table 4.3: Opportunity cost (in $/MWh) for different FTRs.
Sink
Source 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.0 7.205 -5.344 17.589 9.974
2 -7.205 0.0 -12.549 10.384 2.769
3 5.344 12.549 0.0 22.934 15.318
4 -17.589 -10.384 -22.934 0.0 -7.615
5 -9.974 -2.769 -15.318 7.615 0.0
nondecreasing concave benefit functions defined as fℓ(τℓ) = βℓτℓ − γℓτ
2
ℓ , ∀ℓ ∈ F , are given
in Table B.3. The HPRs for all the FTR bids are computed and listed in Table 4.4. The
low HPRs of G4’s bids show that their bids are more gambling than hedging positions. On
the other hand, the highest values of HPRs are for τ12, τ16, τ24, τ1 and τ2 which are the




























Figure 4.7: G4’s profit under different strategies.
In another simulation, the standard IEEE fourteen-node system is used to represent
the transmission system [120]. It is assumed that there are 8 suppliers, each one located
(and accordingly named) at nodes 1, two at node 2, 4, 5, 11, 13 and 14; there are also
10 demands, one located at each node except at nodes 1, 2, 7 and 8. Based upon a set
of nodal prices –see Table 4.5, the most profitable FTRs are considered; among them are
those having as source the nodes 1, 2 and 3. It is assumed that all market participants can
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Table 4.4: Hedging position ratios.
ℓ φℓ (p.u.) ℓ φℓ (p.u.)
1 0.7427 15 0.4050
2 0.7427 16 0.8608
3 0.6562 17 0.1970
4 0.1640 18 0.6966
5 0.5251 19 0.4501
6 0.5323 20 0.5922
7 0.6498 21 0.7357
8 0.6002 22 0.6187
9 0.2981 23 0.5448
10 0.2423 24 0.7438
11 0.5795 25 0.0457
12 1.0000 26 0.5422
13 0.4965 27 0.3855
14 0.0000
bid for them. For this simulation, 288 bids were considered. For the sake of comparison,
only the HPRs of bids for FTRs going from node 1 to node 5 (τ1→5), and from node 3 to
node 12 (τ3→12) are depicted in Figure 4.8. In the first case, the FTR is defined from a low-
Table 4.5: Nodal prices in the fourteen-node system.
i ρi i ρi
($/MWh) ($/MWh)
1 23.8837 8 46.1546
2 34.6167 9 46.3034
3 40.6550 10 46.1411
4 45.8717 11 45.7722
5 49.7545 12 48.9876
6 49.2179 13 48.8077
7 46.1546 14 47.3983
cost generation node to a high-cost demand node, and its HPRs are illustrated in Figure
4.8.a. Here, G1 is the cheapest generator and one of the most affected by congestion; it has
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the highest HPR. In contrast, G8 which is placed at node 14, has the lowest HPR. In the
second case, most of the bids for the second case have low HPRs, denoting the low-hedging
position this FTR provides to most of the market participants. Notice that the second




























G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 L10
(b) τ3→12
Figure 4.8: HPRs for the fourteen-node system.
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4.2.3 Change in network configuration
In the operation of power systems, there are many factors or events that cause transmission
lines failures. One of the classical consideration is the lost of a transmission line, called
the n-1 contingency. Since a transmission line outage produces a change in the network
configuration, all the transmission usage factors will change. In order to show how changes
in the network configuration affect the HPRs, they are computed under the n-1 contingency
case; a comparison of the HPRs is given in Table 4.6.
The HPRs will change as long as the network configuration does; this comes from
the fact that the HPRs are based on the operation conditions. This feature allows them
to capture the changing conditions of the market, and, therefore, the current positions
that market participants have in the market. For instance, consider the lost of line 1-
2 (contingency 1); G4 is now placed within a load pocket, and its position to behave
strategically is even stronger. All of its bids for FTRs (ℓ = 4, 10, 14, 17, 25) have an HPR
of zero. On the other hand, the highest value is for bid 24 from L3; this load is facing
the highest market price. The second highest value is for bid 22 from G3; this generator
is facing the lowest market price, and is outside the load pocket. Similar analysis can be
done for the other contingencies.
4.2.4 Modified auction for FTRs
Extending the five-node example previously studied, it is now considered a daily demand
profile (shown in Figure 4.9) in order to represent a historic market outcome. In this
simulation, the mean values of the HPRs are based only on the hours when congestion
occurs –see Figure 4.10. The FTR auction (4.15)–(4.18) is implemented as a quadratic
programming problem, and solved by a primal-dual interior point method [131]. The results
from both the standard and the proposed FTR auctions are summarized in Table 4.7.
As observed in Table 4.7, the inclusion of the HPRs changes the allocation of FTRs with
respect to the standard FTR auction. It can be seen that the proposed HPRs screen the
low-hedging position that any FTR provides to G4, and, therefore, it can help to mitigate
the room to exercise market power by G4. See for instance, the cases for τ10 and τ14 in
Table 4.7; within the standard auction, G4 is awarded both FTRs in the amount of 120MW
each; in contrast, within the modified auction, G4 would have both FTR awards reduced
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Table 4.6: HPRs for the n-1 contingencies (p.u.).
Contingency Line
ℓ None 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.742 0.852 0.770 0.713 0.110 0.560 0.169
2 0.742 0.403 0.770 0.414 0.074 0.532 0.092
3 0.656 0.877 0.780 0.779 0.390 0.762 0.307
4 0.131 0.0 0.214 0.200 0.0 0.232 0.0
5 0.525 0.352 0.245 0.400 0.234 0.510 0.385
6 0.532 0.438 0.088 0.509 0.182 0.564 0.110
7 0.649 0.803 0.732 0.645 0.471 0.593 0.254
8 0.600 0.614 0.356 0.522 0.624 0.598 0.615
9 0.298 0.614 0.267 0.361 0.0 0.394 0.307
10 0.193 0.0 0.503 0.408 0.093 0.367 0.000
11 0.579 0.0 0.334 0.413 0.0 0.406 0.0
12 1.000 0.0 0.532 0.770 0.624 0.805 0.307
13 0.496 0.0 0.431 0.421 0.347 0.288 0.124
14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15 0.405 0.0 0.106 0.230 0.234 0.281 0.016
16 0.860 0.693 0.503 1.000 0.579 0.931 0.417
17 0.197 0.0 0.0 0.487 0.066 0.232 0.000
18 0.696 0.474 0.324 0.441 0.385 0.747 0.473
19 0.450 0.569 0.687 0.403 0.316 0.593 0.372
20 0.592 0.875 0.728 0.622 0.719 0.777 0.865
21 0.735 0.737 0.897 0.678 0.775 0.835 1.000
22 0.618 0.929 0.699 0.561 0.707 0.754 0.730
23 0.544 0.681 0.435 0.383 0.409 0.616 0.316
24 0.743 1.000 1.000 0.865 1.000 1.000 0.692
25 0.036 0.0 0.074 0.085 0.0 0.078 0.0
26 0.542 0.0 0.059 0.408 0.0 0.367 0.214
27 0.385 0.175 0.376 0.345 0.046 0.353 0.561























Figure 4.9: Daily demand profile.














Figure 4.10: Mean values for the HPRs.
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Table 4.7: Allocation of financial transmission rights (in MW).
Standard Auction Proposed Auction
ℓ τ ∗ℓ τ ℓ τ
∗
ℓ τ ℓφℓ τ
∗
ℓ † τ ℓ †
1 110 110 85.88 85.88 110 110
2 100 100 78.07 78.08 100 100
3 300 300 182.01 182.01 300 300
4 0.0 120 0.0 21.08 0.0 0.0
5 0.0 300 130.73 141.27 0.0 300
6 0.0 580 0.0 284.49 0.0 580
7 0.0 110 0.0 71.88 0.0 110
8 0.0 300 0.0 162.78 0.0 300
9 0.0 300 0.0 87.06 0.0 0.0
10 120 120 33.84 33.84 0.0 0.0
11 0.0 300 176.25 176.25 130 300
12 300 300 298.68 298.68 300 300
13 110 110 54.05 54.05 110 110
14 120 120 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15 190 300 106.11 106.11 300 300
16 0.0 580 0.0 482.27 0.0 580
17 0.0 150 40.33 40.33 0.0 0.0
18 0.0 300 0.0 188.46 0.0 300
19 0.0 110 0.0 48.65 0.0 110
20 0.0 580 0.0 354.49 0.0 580
21 0.0 300 0.0 202.92 0.0 300
22 0.0 580 0.0 385.58 0.0 580
23 0.0 100 0.0 52.08 0.0 100
24 166.24 300 125.91 210.27 166.23 300
25 0.0 120 6.72 6.72 0.0 0.0
26 0.0 300 10.66 59.52 0.0 0.0
27 22.38 300 125.42 125.46 32.40 300
† A threshold φ̂ = 0.35 is introduced.
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to 33.84 MW and 0 MW, respectively. Nonetheless, because of the new FTR allocation,
G4 is now awarded with 40.33 MW and 6.72 MW of τ17 and τ25, respectively. Although G4
still holds some FTRs, the awarded amounts are quite smaller than those of the original
auction. A stronger discrimination is to introduce an HPR threshold; this avoids G4 getting
FTRs, among other low-hedging positions.
4.3 Summary
The ownership of FTRs may exacerbate the market power of some price-maker participants.
The methodology proposed in this chapter can be used to screen and discriminate financial
transmission rights with such potential opportunities. The methodology is based upon the
use of relative hedging position ratios; these ratios comprise the network configuration,
market outcomes and the participants position in the market. The proposed methodology
preserves the classical auction format while some market participants are explicitly banned
from obtaining either certain FTRs or more than a specified amount of them. Due to the
incipient sophistication of loads, emphasis is given to the generators’ side.
In addition to the proposed methodology, after FTRs have been allocated it is required
that FTRs be subject to a screening in the secondary markets in order to limit those
participants which were previously discriminated in the auction. On the other hand, this
screening and mitigation process could be envisioned as a complement in the surveillance
for market power in electricity markets.
As it’s well known, an FTR scheme has a reduced liquidity; if a discrimination is
introduced, like in this case, it may worsen such a liquidity. Moreover, market participants
may be reluctant to any kind of intervention. What seems to be evident is that a generator
should not hold an FTR which has as the sink the node/zone where the generator is
located. Due to the potential complexity for carrying out any regulatory intervention on
FTRs ownership, so far an alternative may be to build the FTR framework upon their
allocation to other entities, such as loads or traders, rather than generators.
In fact, in order to deter market power, some markets allow non-transmission users,
say, traders or arbitragers, to participate in the auctions for FTRs [63]. In this case, FTRs
become investments opportunities rather than hedging instruments.
Chapter 5
Equilibrium Models of Markets for
Financial Transmission Rights
Equilibrium models of markets for FTRs are presented in this chapter. These markets are
formulated by using a set of equilibrium conditions for each market participant. Within
the models, a conjectured congestion price response function is introduced to characterize
the influence of bidders on the FTR prices. The proposed models are used to study the
impact of the bidding strategies on the market for financial transmission rights. Different
kinds of FTRs are modelled, such as i) obligations; ii) options; and iii) joint obligations
and options. Under this framework, one-period, multi-round and multi-period markets for
FTRs are formulated. The models are illustrated by a three-node power system and then
extended to five- and thirty-node systems using a DC-network approximation.
This chapter is organized as follows. In §5.1, an introduction to obligations and options
is given. Conjecture congestion price functions are presented in §5.2. Models of one-period
markets for obligations, options, and joint obligations and options are described in §5.3,
5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Numerical examples for these cases are given in §5.6. In §5.7 and
5.8, models of multi-round and multi-period markets are formulated. Remarks in §5.9 close
the chapter .
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5.1 Premium vs. Liability
Because of the financial attributes of FTRs, the commitment of their holders is financial
rather than physical; i.e., an FTR holder is not required to inject/withdraw power. Due
to this feature, FTRs can be considered as financial derivatives [132]. Given an FTR, τν,i,j,
going from node i to node j, its associated payoff is Π=τ
ν,i,j
(ρj–ρi). If ρj–ρi<0, the payoff is
a charge or a liability for the holder; if ρj–ρi>0, the payoff is a reimbursement or premium
for the holder. If both payoff directions are comprised, the FTR is an obligation because the
contract has to be exercised even when the payoff becomes negative –see Figure 5.1. In this
case, an FTR can be seen as a forward contract for the price of transmission congestion.
Nevertheless, even negative payoffs are the right market signals to have a complete hedge
and a full utilization of the system capacity [133].







Figure 5.1: Obligation and option payoffs.
On the other hand, an FTR can be defined as an option so that the holder can choose
when to exercise the transmission right. In this case, if ρj–ρi>0, the holder of the right is
compensated (exercised option); however, if ρj–ρi<0, the holder is not charged (unexercised
option). Consequently, the payoff associated with the option becomes Π = τν,i,jmax(0, ρj–
ρi). Naturally, because of their superiority, options tend to cost more than obligations.
Although the options format is more advantageous for the potential holders, the issuance of
options requires to put in place more restricted conditions within their allocation process.
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The issuance of pure options has the drawback of offering, at most, only the maximum
physical capacity of the interfaces.
An option may or may not be exercised; but this fact is not known until the energy
market is cleared. Thus, in the ex ante issuance of options, this feature has to be taken into
account. A complexity arises because the system feasibility must be preserved under any
combination of exercised options. Hence, the impact of each option on the transmission
constraints has to be individually recognized. This implies that any possible counterflow
has to be disregarded. This constraint reduces the offered capacity for transmission rights.
Nowadays, due to this burden in the implementation of markets for options, their issuance
is restrained to a subset of all the potential options. This is the case of the FTR market in
PJM [134].
One of the motivations to develop the flowgate model is that they are inherently options.
This is because the FGRs are directional; therefore, the holder of an FGR has the right
only in a single direction. In the most extreme case, where operation conditions reverse
some power flows in the network, the expected and traded forward FGRs have no worth
anymore. Neither FTRs nor FGRs, defined just as options, allow traders to get enough
rights to schedule/hedge the full set of transactions when counterflows are required to
implement their transactions. There is also a relationship between FTRs and FGRs, as
pointed out in [61] and [135], which states that FTRs can be decomposed as portfolios of
FGRs. If portfolios of FGRs were implemented, the FGRs as portfolio should be centrally
coordinated and auctioned so that the feasibility could be preserved. Due to this difficulty,
FGRs are envisioned to be useful only as financial instruments to partially hedge congestion
in relatively short periods, e.g., monthly issuance.
Currently, it is widely recognized that the combination of options and obligations for
transmission rights can enhance the flexibility of the transmission markets; having both
alternatives, traders could choose the one that works better for them [39,64].
5.2 Influence on Congestion Prices
Within markets for transmission rights, FTRs are allocated at locational marginal prices.
Since FTRs are defined to hedge congestion, losses are not considered and LMPs denote
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the prices to use the transmission capacity; i.e., they are congestion prices. In the proposed
markets formulations, congestion prices are modelled as endogenous variables within the
bidders optimization problems. This implies that bidders can manipulate the congestion
prices, as they are considered price-makers. This is included by means of a conjectured
congestion-price response function.
Let us use the index ℓ ∈ Fν to denote FTRs; while ν ∈ Θ stands for the bidders index.
The sets for obligation FTRs and bidders are denoted by Fν and Θ, respectively. An
FTR can be defined by i) an amount of power τν,ℓ; and ii) the injection (ξν,ℓ,i = −1) and
withdrawal (ξν,ℓ,i = +1) nodes.
Definition 4.1 (Conjectured congestion-price function [71]) Let pi be the net power
injection at node i. As the net transmission service required by bidder ν, at node i, is
∑






 ξh,,iτh,. Therefore, a conjectured congestion-








ν,ℓ), ∀i ∈ I. (5.1)
Alternatively, a conjectured function can be defined to determine the individual impact
of an FTR on the congestion prices,
ων,ℓ = ω
∗
ν,ℓ + Aν,ℓ(τν,ℓ − τ
∗
ν,ℓ), ∀ℓ ∈ Fν , (5.2)
where ων,i and ων,ℓ are the congestion prices seen by ν at node i, and for FTR ℓ, respectively.
At equilibrium, the congestion prices at node i and for FTR ν, ℓ are denoted by ω∗i and
ω∗ν,ℓ. Aν,i and Aν,ℓ are the conjectured congestion-price response parameters either at node
i or for FTR ℓ, respectively. The higher the parameter, the larger the prices change. For
the competitive outcome, Aν,i, Aν,ℓ ≡ 0. These constants can be parametrically varied to
explore the impact of different expectations on price congestion changes.
Both conjectured functions (5.1) and (5.2) are a first-order approximation of bidder ν
expectation of how the congestion prices, ων,i, ∀i and ων,ℓ, ∀ℓ, will change from their equi-
librium values, ω∗i , if ν modifies its demand of transmission capacity. These conjectured
congestion-price functions are an analogy to what has been used for energy markets (con-
jectured supply function [15]), for transmission prices manipulation (conjectured transmis-
sion price response [16]) and spinning reserve price manipulation (conjectured reserve-price
function [48]).
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5.3 A Market for Obligations
Throughout this chapter, the proposed FTR market formulations are based on equilibrium
models; these models are built upon the complementarity conditions of every agent par-
ticipating in the transmission markets. There are two kinds of agents in the market for
transmission rights. On one hand, an independent entity (e.g., an ISO) is in charge of
allocating the transmission rights to bidders and in settling the congestion prices based on
a locational marginal pricing scheme. On the other hand, there are agents which submit
their bids to acquire FTRs. To complete the equilibrium model, a market clearing condi-
tion is introduced. This condition ensures that the supply of transmission rights equals the
demand of them. Without any loss of generality, only the case of FTRs to be purchased
by market participants is covered in this chapter.
5.3.1 FTR bidders problem
A market participant’s problem is to maximize surplus from purchasing FTRs. On one
side, it has a net benefit from purchasing a portfolio of FTRs throughout the system’s
nodes; the concave benefit function, b(τν,ℓ) = βν,ℓτν,ℓ − γν,ℓτ
2
ν,ℓ, is the maximum willingness
to acquire τν,ℓ, where βν,ℓ and γν,ℓ are nonnegative parameters estimated by the bidders, and
to be submitted to the ISO. This function represents the expectation of ν for the avoided
congestion cost if ν holds τν,ℓ when it participates in the energy market.
On the other hand, the FTR portfolio has a cost which is paid to the FTR auctioneer.
As an FTR is defined by the source and sink nodes, its opportunity cost price is given
by the difference of congestion prices between such trading points,
∑
i ων,iξν,ℓ,i. Although
congestion prices are taken as endogenous into each bidder problem, within the equilibrium
problem as a whole, the congestion prices are variables that match the equilibrium values.






















ν,ℓ) = 0, ∀i ∈ I. (5.5)
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Equation (5.4) stands for the feasible capacity of each FTR; while τ ν,ℓ is the maximum
FTR capacity that bidders are willing to acquire. This parameter is estimated by bidders,
and submitted to the ISO.





βν,ℓτν,ℓ − 2γν,ℓτν,ℓ − τν,ℓ
∑
i
ων,iξν,ℓ,i − µν,ℓ(τν,ℓ − τ ν,ℓ)
}
, (5.6)
τν,ℓ, µν,ℓ ≥ 0, ∀ℓ ∈ Fν .
where µν,ℓ is the dual variable associated with the constraints for maximum capacity of
FTR ℓ. The conjectured function (5.5) is not explicitly used as a constraint throughout the
models because it is used to substitute ων,i into the surplus function (5.3); consequently,
there is no dual variable associated with (5.5).
Proposition 5.1 By including a conjecture congestion-price function, the surplus function
for bidder ν remains concave if and only if Aν,i ≥ 0.
Proof. Let the surplus-maximization problem be represented with a vectorial notation.
The variables and parameters are in bold letters to denote their corresponding vectors.
They are defined as follows: βν ∈ R
|Fν |, γν = Diag(γν,ℓ) ∈ R
|Fν |x|Fν |, τ ν ∈ R
|Fν |, ων ∈ R
|I|,
ω∗ ∈ R|I|, ξν ∈ R
|I|x|Fν |, Aν = Diag(Aν,i) ∈ R
|I|x|I|.
Thus, the surplus function can be represented as
Πν = β
T
ν τ ν − τ
T
ν γντ ν −
(








ν τ ν − τ
T
ν γντ ν − ω
∗T ξντ ν − τ
T
ν Bντ ν + τ
∗T Bντ ν , (5.8)
where Bν = ξ
T
ν Aνξν . The matrix ξν stands for the incidence of FTRs across the system
nodes. Notice that ∇2τΠν = −(2γν + Bν). To ensure concavity of the surplus function,
γν+Bν has to be positive semi-definite. Because the diagonal entries of γν are nonnegative,
it follows that γν is positive semi-definite. On the other hand, Bν is positive semi-definite
as long as Aν is so [96]. This holds if and only if the diagonal entries of Aν are nonnegative,
i.e., Aν,i ≥ 0, ∀i, as claimed. 
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Furthermore, by matrix properties [109], if γν,ℓ > 0, ∀ℓ, then γν +Bν becomes positive
definite.
Within the bidder problem, the proof of such concavity ensures that any local solution
will be also a global solution.
5.3.2 ISO problem
In this equilibrium model, the ISO auctions transmission rights to efficiently allocate the
scarce transmission to those who value it most. It is considered that the ISO cannot
manipulate the prices of the transmission services, and, therefore, it sees ω∗i , ∀i as exogenous
variables. Thus, the ISO problem is to maximize the revenue from the sales of FTRs under






where pi, ∀i stands for the power nodal injections; these power injections are the ISO’s
decisions variables which have to be feasible for the transmission system constraints. This
fact implicitly ensures a simultaneous feasibility of the FTRs to be awarded.
The transmission constraints are defined by the DC power flows equations in terms of











k , ∀k ∈ K. (5.11)
Each transmission line is modelled by means of two power flows constraints, one con-
straint per power-flow direction; their corresponding maximum limits are z+k and z
−
k . With-
out any loss of generality, (5.10)–(5.11) define only thermal limits constraints, which are
assumed to be convex; security constraints, such as n-1 constraints, can be similarly mod-

























k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,
pi free, ∀i ∈ I.
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where λ+k and λ
−
k are the dual variables associated with each power flow constraint.
5.3.3 Market clearing condition
There need be a market clearing condition for consistency in the model. Such a condition is
that the demand for transmission capacity required by all bidders equals the transmission





ξν,ℓ,iτν,ℓ , ∀i ∈ I. (5.13)
This matching of supply and demand is what generates the corresponding congestion
prices, ω∗i , ∀i.
5.3.4 Equilibrium model
The optimality conditions for each bidder and the ISO can be gathered, together with the
above market clearing condition, to compose an MLCP. Thus, the optimal allocation of
FTRs is defined by the following MLCP:
• For τν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Fν , ν ∈ Θ:









ξν,ℓ,i − µν,ℓ ⊥ τν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.14)
• For µν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Fν , ν ∈ Θ:
0 ≥ τν,ℓ − τ ν,ℓ ⊥ µν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.15)








k ≥ 0 (5.16)
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k ≥ 0 (5.17)
• For pi, ∀i ∈ I:







k ); pi free (5.18)
• For ω∗i , ∀i ∈ I:











prices (ω∗i ), an equilibrium point of the market for FTRs is obtained.
Definition 5.1 (Market equilibrium) Let xν ∈ Xν be ν’s strategies; strategy xν is
composed by the own decision variables of ν, i.e., xν = {τν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Fν}. Let p ∈ P be
ISO’s strategies; strategy p is composed by the ISO’s decisions, i.e., p = {pi, ∀i ∈ I}. Let
ω = {ωi, ∀i ∈ I} be a vector of congestion prices. The vectors x
∗
ν , ∀ν ∈ V, p
∗ and ω∗
constitute an equilibrium of the transmission market if and only if
(i) Πν(x
∗
ν) ≥ Πν(xν), ∀xν ∈ Xν , ν ∈ Θ with market prices ω
∗; i.e., x∗ν is a solution of
(5.3)–(5.5).
(ii) ΠISO(p
∗) ≥ ΠISO(p), ∀p ∈ P; i.e., y
∗ is a solution of (5.9)–(5.11).
(iii) Given the market prices ω∗, the vectors x∗ and y∗ balance the supply and demand
for transmission rights; i.e., x∗ν and y
∗ satisfy (5.13).
A market equilibrium represents the optimal allocation of FTRs. In this work, the equi-
librium model defined by the MLCP has been formulated in GAMS and solved using the
PATH solver [118].
Proposition 5.2
i) The equilibrium problem (5.14)–(5.19) is equivalent to a Quadratic Programming (QP)
problem.
ii) A market equilibrium point of problem (5.14)–(5.19) will be a global solution.
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This model can be stated as follows:
0 ≤ f + Fu + Ev ⊥ u ≥ 0, (5.20)
0 = d + Gu + Dv, v free, (5.21)
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such that the MLCP is a combination of an LCP and linear equations. As D−1 exists, this
problem can be defined in terms of the nonnegative variables such that the equilibrium
problem is reduced to
0 ≤ q + Mu ⊥ u ≥ 0, (5.22)
where
q = f −ED−1d and M = F −ED−1G. (5.23)
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In addition, let us consider the following decompositions: u ≡ [x, y]T , where x = τ and
y = [µ, λ+, λ−]T ; q ≡ [c, −b]T , where c = −β̂ and b = [−τ̂ , −z+, −z−]T . Then the
equilibrium problem for the obligation FTRs market is the set of KKT conditions for the




xT Qx + cT x
s.t. Ax ≥ b, (5.27)
x ≥ 0,





τ T (B̂ + 2γ̂)τ − β̂
T
τ
s.t. τ ≤ τ̂ ,
Sξ̂τ ≤ z+, (5.28)
−Sξ̂τ ≤ z−,
τ ≥ 0.
The matrix (B̂ + 2γ̂) is positive definite (or semi-definite) because Bν + 2γν , ∀ν is
so –see Proposition 5.1. This turns problem (5.28) into a convex programming problem;
consequently, any local solution is also a global optimum. Moreover, when γ, ∀ ν is positive
definite, problem (5.28) is strictly convex and there exist a unique solution [96]. 
Proposition 5.3 Congestion prices for obligations are defined by the active transmission
constraints.








k ), ∀i ∈ I. (5.29)
These congestion prices are linear combinations of the dual variables related to the trans-
mission constraints. However, only the dual variables of the binding transmission con-
straints may contribute to such prices. Recalling that the price to be charged for τν,ℓ is the







k ), ∀ℓ ∈ Fν. (5.30)

Notice that the congestion price for an obligation is negative as long as the price dif-
ference between the withdrawal and source nodes is so. This can occur, for instance, when
an FTR provides counterflows.
Chapter 5. Equilibrium Models of Markets for FTRs 105
5.4 A Market for Options
The notation used previously for obligation FTRs is preserved in this section, except the
set for options which is now denoted by O. Even though the problem for the allocation of
options is the same as that for obligations, the impact of each option needs to be separately
modelled.
5.4.1 FTR bidders problem
When option FTRs are to be auctioned, the surplus-maximization problem for bidder ν is
the same as that for obligations. However, for the sake of modelling, the opportunity cost
price for the ℓ-th option is now defined as a one-part congestion fee, ων,ℓ =
∑
i ων,iξν,ℓ,i;










s.t. 0 ≤ τν,ℓ ≤ τ ν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν , (5.32)
ων,ℓ − ω
∗
ν,ℓ −Aν,ℓ(τν,ℓ − τ
∗
ν,ℓ) = 0, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν . (5.33)
The conjectured congestion-price function (5.33) is also defined for each FTR option.







ν,ℓ − ων,ℓτν,ℓ − µν,ℓ(τν,ℓ − τ ν,ℓ)
}
, (5.34)
τν,ℓ, µν,ℓ ≥ 0, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν .
5.4.2 ISO problem






where pν,ℓ stands for the ISO decision variables. These variables can be seen as transmission
capacities to be set for each transmission right. Since a transmission capacity cannot be
negative, then pν,ℓ ≥ 0.
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The power flow equations are now based upon the separate contribution of FTR op-
tions. This is done by means of their Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs),
∑
i sk,iξν,ℓ,i. Under any combination of options, the simultaneous feasibility of the sys-
tem must be preserved. For each transmission constraint, only the options that positively
impact (
∑
i sk,iξν,ℓ,i > 0) on the transmission constraint are considered, but options that
produce counterflows (
∑

























k , ∀k ∈ K. (5.37)
The computation of the PTDFs for the options, and the direction of their contribution to
the power flows can be done outside the equilibrium problem. Hence, the operatormax(·, ·),
in constraints (5.36) and (5.37), does not represent an extra burden to the equilibrium
problem.











































k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,
pν,ℓ ≥ 0, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν .
5.4.3 Market clearing condition
Since each option has to be individually modelled in order to capture its impact on the
transmission constraints, it is no longer possible to add up all the options to obtain net
nodal power injections. Then a market clearing condition is associated with every FTR
pν,ℓ = τν,ℓ , ∀ℓ ∈ Oν , ν ∈ Θ. (5.39)
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Under equilibrium, the transmission capacity demanded for each FTR is matched with the
transmission capacity offered by the ISO; this balancing condition generates the congestion
prices at which the rights are traded.
5.4.4 Equilibrium model
Based on the Lagrangian for the bidders and ISO problems, the allocation of option FTRs
is casted as the following equilibrium problem:
• For τν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν :




− µν,ℓ ⊥ τν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.40)
• For µν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν :
0 ≥ τν,ℓ − τ ν,ℓ ⊥ µν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.41)
• For pν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν , ν ∈ Θ:














⊥ pν,ℓ ≥ 0
(5.42)















k ≥ 0 (5.43)















k ≥ 0 (5.44)
• For ω∗ν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν , ν ∈ Θ:
0 = pν,ℓ − τν,ℓ; ω
∗
ν,ℓ free (5.45)
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Proposition 5.4 The congestion prices for option FTRs are non-negative.















, ∀ pν,ℓ > 0. (5.46)
The congestion prices for options are linear combinations of the congestion multipliers,





0, ∀k andmax(·, ·) ≥ 0; then it follows that the linear combination of congestion multipliers
is nonnegative, and, consequently, ω∗ν,ℓ ≥ 0, ∀ν, ℓ. 
5.5 A Joint Market for Obligations and Options
The market model for joint obligations and options is built upon the formulation for options
introduced in §5.4. For the sake of simplicity in the notation, the index ℓ is used for
obligations as well as for options. The super-indices (f) and (o) stand for the obligation
and option version, respectively.
5.5.1 FTR bidders problem
The FTR portfolio of bidder ν is composed by a subset of obligations (Fν) and a subset



































s.t. 0 ≤ τν,ℓ ≤ τ
f
ν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Fν , (5.48)
0 ≤ τ oν,ℓ ≤ τ
o


















ν,ℓ) = 0, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν . (5.51)
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ν,ℓ ≥ 0 ∀ℓ ∈ Fν ,
τ oν,ℓ, µ
o
ν,ℓ ≥ 0 ∀ℓ ∈ Oν .
5.5.2 ISO problem
The ISO objective is to maximize the net profit from the allocation of transmission capacity

















The power flows are now defined in terms of the individual contributions of both obli-





















































≤ z−k . (5.55)
Due to this superposition of FTRs, both obligations and options are competing for
the same transmission capacity. The ISO decision variables, pfν,ℓ, p
o
ν,ℓ ≥ 0, stand for the
transmission capacity to be supplied by the ISO in order to satisfy the demand of obligations
and options.
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k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,
pfν,ℓ, p
o
ν,ℓ ≥ 0, ∀ℓ.
5.5.3 Market clearing conditions
There is a market clearing condition for obligations and another for options, i.e.,
pfν,ℓ = τ
f
ν,ℓ , ∀ℓ ∈ Fν , ∀ν ∈ Θ, (5.57)
poν,ℓ = τ
o
ν,ℓ , ∀ℓ ∈ Oν , ∀ν ∈ Θ. (5.58)
Each market clearing condition generates the corresponding congestion prices ω∗fν,ℓ and
ω∗oν,ℓ. This implies that obligations and options are separately priced, even though they are
simultaneously allocated. This arises from the fact that each kind –obligation or option–
of FTRs has different requirements of transmission capacity, even for the same FTR.
5.5.4 Equilibrium model
The following MLCP comprises all the complementarity conditions of the ISO and bidders
problems, and the market clearing conditions. The solution to this equilibrium problem
simultaneously provides the optimal allocation of obligations and options.
• For τ fν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Fν , ν ∈ Θ:












− µfν,ℓ ⊥ τ
f
ν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.59)
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• For τ oν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν , ν ∈ Θ:












− µoν,ℓ ⊥ τ
o
ν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.60)
• For µfν,k, ∀ℓ ∈ Fν , ν ∈ Θ:




ν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.61)
• For µoν,k, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν , ν ∈ Θ:




ν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.62)
• For pfν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Fν , ν ∈ Θ:









k ) ⊥ p
f
ν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.63)
• For poν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν , ν ∈ Θ:


















⊥ poν,ℓ ≥ 0
(5.64)



























− z+k ⊥ λ
+
k ≥ 0 (5.65)
































• For ω∗fν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Fν , ν ∈ Θ:
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• For ω∗oν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ Oν , ν ∈ Θ:





Proposition 5.5 Given an FTR in a joint market for obligations and options, the price
for the option version is equal or higher than the price for the obligation version.






































, ∀poν,ℓ > 0. (5.70)
Since ξfν,ℓ,i ≡ ξ
o




















































This result comes from the insertion of the price components associated with negative
PTDFs. Unlike obligations, negative price components are disregarded in the option price,
and, hence, they do not counteract the positive price components.
5.6 Numerical Examples
For illustrative purposes, the equilibrium models have been implemented using a three-
node system. This small test system allows one to understand how the FTR allocation is.
Afterwards, the models are applied to a five-node system.
Chapter 5. Equilibrium Models of Markets for FTRs 113
5.6.1 A three-node system
Let us consider the system shown in Figure 5.2. It is assumed that suppliers are placed at
nodes 1 and 2, while a demand is placed at node 3. The network is modelled as lossless and
with equal transmission lines’ reactance; transmission lines 1-2, 1-3 and 2-3 (labelled as







Figure 5.2: Three-node power system.
configuration, with an amount of power transferred from node 1 to node 3, two-thirds of
power flow through line 2, and one-third of power flows through lines 1 and 3. Similarly,
with an amount of power transferred from node 2 to node 3, two-thirds of power flow
through line 3, and one-third of power flows through lines 1 and 2.
Under point-to-point financial transmission rights, two transmission rights can be nat-
urally considered: i) an FTR for generator 1 from node 1 to node 3; and ii) an FTR
for generator 2 from node 2 to node 3. These FTRs are defined by the benefit functions
B(τ1,1) = 6τ1,1 and B(τ2,1) = 5τ2,1, and maximum limits τ ν,ℓ=1500 MW. Due to the FTR
configuration, their power flows counteract each other in transmission line 1 while their
power flows reinforce each other in lines 2 and 3.
First, consider the case of obligations; in a transmission-right market, both FTRs may
be issued in order to achieve the optimal allocation of transmission capacity. The coun-
terflow that one FTR provides to the other is implicitly considered within the obligation
version. Thus, for the issuance of obligations, it is only required that the superposition of
both FTRs be feasible for the transmission system. Depending on the amount issued for
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each obligation, different transmission line constraints can become active. All the feasible
combinations of both obligations are comprised in the monogram (shaded area) depicted in














































































Figure 5.3: Feasible region for the issuance of obligations.
mission lines 2 and 3 are binding. The corresponding congestion multipliers are $7/MW
and $4/MW , respectively. In line 1, the counterflow that τ1,1 provides to τ2,1 is represented
by the constraint −z1. On the other hand, the counterflow that τ2,1 provides to τ1,1 is given
by the constraint z1. The positive slope of these constraints implies that if the power of
one obligation is increased, providing more counterflow, the other obligation can also be
increased. In contrast, the constraints for transmission lines 2 and 3 have negative slopes.
This implies that if an obligation is increased, the other will have to be decreased in order
to compensate the extra capacity required.
Let us now consider the issuance of options; assume that the options are defined by the
same benefit functions used for obligations. Any counterflow provided by an option has
to be disregarded since it may happen that such an option is not exercised. Hence, there
is a reduction of the transmission capacity to be allocated, as shown in Figure 5.4. The
transmission capacity of line 1 to be allocated to each option is, at most, the transmission
power flow limit. The transmission constraints for line 1 in both directions are denoted by













































































































Feasible region Reduced transmission capacity
Counterflow by τ1,1 Counterflow by τ2,1
Figure 5.4: Feasible region for the issuance of options.
z′1 and −z
′
1. The shaded areas in both corners stand for the transmission capacity that
cannot be allocated in order to preserve feasibility under the exercise of any combination
of options. The optimal allocation, denoted as Πo, occurs when transmission lines 1 and 3
are binding; their corresponding dual variables are $10.5/MW and $7.5/MW , respectively.
The market outcomes comparison is presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Outcome comparison for different FTR markets with Aν,ℓ = 0.0.
Obligations Options
τ1,1 τ2,1 τ1,1 τ2,1
Award (MW ) 350 200 270 240
Price ($/MW ) 6 5 6 5
Cost ($) 2,100 1,000 1,620 1,200
Benefit ($) 2,100 1,000 1,620 1,200
Surplus ($) 0 0 0 0
ISO Revenue ($) 3,100 2,820
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As expected, less transmission capacity is allocated to option FTRs. This also reduces
the ISO revenues from the sales of FTRs. For obligations and options, the FTR prices
are the same and equal to the marginal value of bidders. The simultaneous feasibility for
























a) τ1,1 b) τ2,1 Net power flows


















a) τ1,1 b) τ2,1 c) τ1,1+ τ2,1
Figure 5.6: Simultaneous feasibility of options.
For obligations, both FTRs have to be considered; otherwise, there will be a violation
in the transmission power limit of line 1. In contrast, for options, there can be 3 potential
combinations, and for all of them the system feasibility is preserved. Case a) is when the
option τ1,1 is exercised, and this binds the transmission constraint 1 (90 MW). Case b) is
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when option τ2,1 is exercised; this option does not bind any transmission line. However,
this option cannot be further increased because if both options were exercised the outcome
would be unfeasible. Finally, in Case c), both options are exercised, and the constraint of
transmission line 3 (250 MW) becomes active.
In a second simulation, let us consider how changes in the bidder strategies can influence
the congestion prices; for a study case, consider Aν,ℓ = 0.01 for both FTRs, and for both
obligations and options. The market outcomes are shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Outcome comparison for different FTR markets with Aν,ℓ = 0.01.
Obligations Options
τ1,1 τ2,1 τ1,1 τ2,1
Award (MW ) 350 200 270 240
Price ($/MW ) 2.5 3 3.3 2.6
Cost ($) 875 600 891 624
Benefit ($) 2,100 1,000 1,620 1,200
Surplus ($) 1,225 400 729 576
ISO Revenue ($) 1,475 1,515
Although the FTR bidders have the congestion prices decreased for both obligations
and options, they are still awarded with the same amount of FTRs. As a result of lower
congestion prices, each bidder increases its surplus, and, therefore, the ISO revenues are
decreased from $3100 to $1475 in the case of obligations, and from $2820 to $1515 in the case
of options. Furthermore, in the case of obligations, the congestion prices for transmission
lines 2 and 3, are reduced to $2/MW and $3.5MW , respectively. Whereas for options, the
congestion prices for lines 1 and 3 are reduced to $6/MW and $3.9/MW , respectively.
The impact on the bidders’ surplus of different bidding strategies is depicted in Figure
5.7. Based on these plots, one can see how the bidders’ surplus is affected under different
assumptions of congestion-price changes. For instance, for option τ1,1, in the flat region
of the surplus (F ), bidder 1 can freely alter the congestion prices to increase its surplus,
regardless the bidding strategy of τ2,1. This is because option τ1,1 is what binds transmission
constraint 1; in this line, however, the power flow from option τ2,1 is disregarded because


















































a) Obligation τ1,1 b) Option τ1,1
Figure 5.7: Bidders’ surplus for different bidding strategies.
of its opposite direction, and, hence, it has no impact. In contrast, for obligation τ1,1 this
also holds, but in a smaller zone. This is because the complementarity effect between
obligations is taken into account to preserve feasibility.
On the other hand, the prices for transmission rights can be computed from the con-
gestion multipliers. For instance, for obligation τ2,1, the price component from line 2 is
(1/3)($2/MW ), while the price component from line 3 is (2/3)($3.5/MW ), what makes
the price of $3/MW for such an obligation. On the other hand, the price for option τ2,1
is given by the component from line 3: (2/3)($3.9/MW )=$2.6/MW . Although the con-
gestion multiplier from line 1 is $6/MW , the power flow from this option is in opposite
direction and, consequently, its corresponding price component is zero.
5.6.2 A five-node system
In this section, the proposed equilibrium models are implemented using the five-node system
given in Appendix B. There are 3 bidders who have identified 9 types –obligation and
option– of FTRs that could become valuable. FTRs’ data are listed in Table B.4. For
the issuance of both obligations and options, the competitive outcome is first computed;
afterwards, it is considered the potential bidders’ influence on congestion prices (Aν,ℓ =
0.025, ∀ν , ℓ). The market outcomes for both cases are summarized in Tables 5.3–5.6.
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In the case of obligations, as bidders influence the congestion prices, such prices go
down. This influence of congestion prices can be seen as the bidders ability to capture some
moneys from the ISO’s congestion rents, an analogy to the strategic behaviour described
in [9]. This also causes that bidders can have extra FTRs awarded, such as τν,4 and τν,8.
In most of the cases, bidders benefits are not altered; however, the costs to acquire FTRs
are lower, and, consequently, their corresponding surpluses are increased. Hence, all FTR
bidders are better off. For the issuance of options, due to the lack of counterflows, there
Table 5.3: Awards and prices for obligations.
Aν,ℓ = 0.0 Aν,ℓ = 0.025





(MW ) ($/MW ) (MW ) ($/MW )
1 110 14.98 110 14.14
4 120 43.01 120 39.56
1 5 110 58.86 110 54.51
9 0.0 15.84 1.48 14.95
1 100 14.98 100 14.14
4 0.0 43.01 13.25 39.56
2 5 120 58.86 120 54.51
8 0.0 24.00 37.08 20.99
9 0.0 15.84 1.52 14.95
1 300 14.98 300 14.14
4 300 43.01 300 39.56
3 5 190.05 58.86 176.79 54.51
8 166.15 24.00 129.07 20.99
9 22.55 15.84 32.77 14.95
is a different market outcome with respect to the issuance of obligations. However, the
issuance of options has led to higher FTR prices, e.g., for τν,1, the obligation is priced at
$14.98/MW while the option is priced at $19.95/MW . In spite of the bidders influence
on prices, no extra FTRs have been awarded. This is because options, at some degree, are
independent across them as no option counterflow is needed for feasibility of others. This
also causes the price influence to be more pronounced in the obligation case. As a result,
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the auctioneer has its market revenue reduced from $54775.11 to $50554.73 for obligations,
and from $49, 603.48 to $47, 798.6 for options.
Table 5.4: Cost, benefit and surplus (in $) for obligations.
Aν,ℓ = 0.0 Aν,ℓ = 0.025
ν ℓ ω∗ν,ℓτν,ℓ B(τν,ℓ) πν,ℓ ω
∗
ν,ℓτν,ℓ B(τν,ℓ) πν,ℓ
1 1,648.1 2,139.5 491.3 1,555.4 2,139.5 584.0
4 5,161.1 7,178.4 2,017.2 4,747.5 7,178.4 2,430.8
1 5 6,474.5 6,569.7 95.1 5,997.1 6,569.7 572.6
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.1 22.2 0.06
1 1,498.3 2040 541.6 1,414.0 2,040 626
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 524.3 529.4 5.09
2 5 7,063.1 7,771.2 708.0 6,542.3 7,771.2 1,228.8
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 778.8 814.5 35.7
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.8 22.9 0.06
1 4,495.0 7,050 2,554.9 4242.0 7050 2,807.9
4 12,902.9 14,640 1,737.0 11,868.7 14,640 2,771.2
3 5 11,186.3 11,294.7 108.3 9,638.8 10,514.0 875.2
8 3,988.1 4,070.9 82.8 2,710.4 3,176.9 466.5
9 357.2 359.0 1.7 490.0 520.7 30.6
5.7 A Multi-Round Market for Obligations
In order to enhance price discovery in the FTRs markets, sequential auctions can be imple-
mented. These auctions, called multi-round auctions, allow market participants to adapt
their successive bids. In each round, only a portion of the transmission capacity is auc-
tioned. FTRs awarded in one round are modelled as fixed injections in subsequent rounds.
The auction outcome of each round can be made available to participants before the next
round takes place in order to provide for price discovery. For instance, in the PJM market
[134], the transmission capacity is offered for sale in a multi-round auction consisting of
four rounds. Twenty-five percent of the feasible FTR capability of the system is auctioned
in each round.
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Table 5.5: Awards and prices for options.
Aν,ℓ = 0.0 Aν,ℓ = 0.025





(MW ) ($/MW ) (MW ) ($/MW )
1 4.27 19.95 24.46 19.14
1 4 120 49.95 120 49.80
5 110 58.97 110 55.60
1 86.89 19.95 50.16 19.14
2 18.18 59.90 96.35 57.10
2 5 120 58.97 120 55.60
6 150 64.95 150 64.55
1 300 19.95 167.31 19.14
4 5.98 49.95 5.98 49.80
3 5 170.67 58.97 141.74 55.60
6 16.03 64.95 16.04 64.55
Table 5.6: Cost, benefit and surplus (in $) for options.
Aν,ℓ = 0.0 Aν,ℓ = 0.025
ν ℓ ω∗ν,ℓτν,ℓ B(τν,ℓ) πν,ℓ ω
∗
ν,ℓτν,ℓ B(τν,ℓ) πν,ℓ
1 85.4 85.4 00 468.2 486.2 17.9
1 4 5,994.2 7,178.4 1,184.1 5,976.2 7,178.4 1,202.1
5 6,487.3 6,569.7 82.4 6,116.6 6,569.7 453.1
1 1,734.1 1,779.4 45.3 960.3 1,038.3 78.0
2 1,089.2 1,090.0 0.8 5,502.6 5,757.9 255.3
2 5 7,077.1 7,771.2 694.0 6,672.6 7,771.2 1,098.5
6 9,742.7 10,443.7 700.9 9,682.6 10,443.7 761.1
1 5,987.1 7,050 1,062.8 3,203.1 4,042.9 839.8
4 299.1 299.2 0.1 298.2 299.2 1.04
3 5 10,065.5 10,152.9 87.3 7,882 8,444.5 562.5
6 1,041.4 1,041.8 0.3 1,035.7 1,042.5 6.8
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First, it is derived how the participants problem and equilibrium model are re-formulated,
and then the iterative procedure is presented. The super-index r ∈ R is used throughout
this section to denote each market round. In addition, an auxiliary set R̂ ⊂ R stands for
cumulative market rounds up to a current round, while |R̂| denotes the set cardinality.
5.7.1 FTR bidders problem
Let us consider the case of a market for obligations described in §5.3. For the multi-round
market, the bidders problem remains the same; all the variables and parameters are indexed
for each round.
5.7.2 ISO problem
Besides indexing all variables and parameters in the ISO problem, the power-flow limits in
the transmission lines are re-defined. Since transmission configuration remains the same
for all rounds, the constants sk,i are not indexed by r. Now the transmission limits are
set to be the cumulative capacity up to the current round. Thus, for the r-th round,
the transmission capacity in each direction is increased by z+rk or z
−r
k with respect to the


























z−rk , ∀k ∈ K. (5.76)
5.7.3 Market clearing condition
For this kind of market, the ISO has to take into account the FTR awards from previ-
ous rounds. Such awards represent already committed transmission capacity which is not
available to be offered. In the r-th round, the transmission capacity supplied by the ISO
must equal the capacity to be allocated, via FTRs, plus the awarded FTRs from previous
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i , ∀i ∈ I. (5.77)
5.7.4 Equilibrium model
Based on the model formulation for obligations in §5.3, the derivation of the complemen-
tarity conditions for each market participant problem is straightforward. Likewise above
formulations, all the complementarity and market clearing conditions are gathered to com-
pose the following equilibrium problem:
• For τ rν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ F
r
ν , ν ∈ Θ:



















ν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.78)
• For µrν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ F
r
ν , ν ∈ Θ:




ν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.79)
• For pri , ∀i ∈ I:






















k ≥ 0 (5.81)












k ≥ 0 (5.82)
• For ω∗ri , ∀i ∈ I:
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5.7.5 Iterative procedure
An outline of the multi-round market for FTRs is shown next.
Algorithm 1 Multi-round market for FTRs.
STEP 0 Initialization:
Set pci = 0, ∀i ∈ I.
Set r = 1.
STEP 1 Compute an equilibrium:
Set |R̂| = r.
Solve (5.78)–(5.83) for τ rν,ℓ.
STEP 2 Update awarded transmission capacity:






ν,ℓ, ∀i ∈ I.








ν,ℓ, ∀i ∈ I.
STEP 3 Finalization:
If r = |R|, stop; otherwise, r ← r + 1 and return to STEP 1.




Given the three-node example in §5.6.1, consider an extension of a four-round market for
obligations. The benefit function parameters for both FTRs are listed in Table 5.7. In each
round, the transmission capacity for lines 1, 2 and 3 are 22.5, 75 and 62.5 MW, respectively.
Table 5.7: Benefit function parameters (in $/MW ) for FTRs.
Round







1 1 6 5.5 4.7 4.6
2 1 5 5 4.9 4.6
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The market outcomes are summarized in Table 5.8. Due to the FTRs and the network
configuration are the same in each round, the market outcome in each round is of the same
kind. The FTR awards are the same through the rounds, and equal to 25% of that of the
one-period market outcome from §5.6.1. However, the FTR prices are different in each
round because the FTRs value, given by their benefit function, is different among rounds.
Table 5.8: Multi-round market outcome.
r ν, ℓ τ rν,ℓ Price Cost ISO Rev.
(MW ) ($/MW ) ($) ($)
1,1 87.5 6 525
1 775
2,1 50 5 250
1,1 87.5 5.5 481.2
2 731.2
2,1 50 5 250
1,1 87.5 4.7 411.2
3 656.2
2,1 50 4.9 245
1,1 87.5 4.6 402.5
4 632.5
2,1 50 4.6 230
Net ISO Revenue ($) 2795
A thirty-node system
The proposed model has been implemented in the standard IEEE-based test power system
of 30 nodes and 41 transmission lines [120]. Twenty FTRs are considered to be issued; they
are shown in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: Source and sink nodes for FTRs.
ℓ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
2 2 2 9 8 15 13 18 23 23 25 25 30 2 15 18 8 18 1 27
1 4 5 10 7 14 16 16 20 25 27 28 28 15 7 30 20 5 29 5
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For Nine FTR portfolios, the parameters of the benefit functions are randomly gener-
ated, and they are grouped into sets of three portfolios. Each set is defined with FTRs of
high, medium and low value. The multi-round market outcome is given in Tables 5.10–5.11.
Table 5.10: FTR prices (in $/MW ). Multi-round market.
ℓ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
r=1 15.8 17.2 42.4 19.2 17.5 16.4 16.8 41.9 40.1 15.7 15.3 17.4 17.1
r=2 18.4 18.9 42.5 17.5 20.0 15.0 16.4 40.3 56.4 18.1 19.4 19.2 14.9
r=3 17.0 17.9 43.9 17.4 16.6 18.6 19.1 49.7 40.0 18.2 17.5 18.6 15.2
r=4 15.1 19.2 42.4 15.0 15.1 16.4 16.4 43.5 39.6 16.9 15.2 17.5 18.1
ℓ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
r=1 16.2 18.7 16.0 16.5 48.3 16.9 17.3
r=2 14.1 14.7 16.1 35.8 47.9 18.9 16.6
r=3 18.3 16.2 23.5 13.9 54.0 14.2 16.3
r=4 17.7 15.7 17.3 15.6 49.1 16.3 15.9
Table 5.11: FTR awards (in MW). Multi-round market.
ν 1 2
ℓ 1 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 15 17 19 20 1 2
r=1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.6 0 0 2.8 20.4 0
r=2 0 0 0 8.2 0 7.8 14.9 0.0 32.1 0.0 6.9 5.0 22.6 8.2
r=3 19.5 24.2 7.7 0.0 10.8 5.5 9.1 5.8 0 2.8 9.9 0 0 0
r=4 20.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.3 0 0 0 2.8 0 0
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Table 5.12: FTR awards (in MW). Multi-round market (continued).
ν 2 3
ℓ 4 5 6 13 14 16 17 19 5 6 7 10 11 12 13
r=1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.3 9.9 0 0 10.6 4.3 6.2
r=2 26.8 10.5 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10
r=3 0 0 9.7 0.0 56.5 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.7
r=4 23.8 0 0 6.2 0 10 3.2 9.1 7.3 0 10.9 5.2 10.6 0 0
ν 3 4 5 6
ℓ 14 15 17 19 4 6 10 7 16 20
r=1 55.6 0 3.2 9.1 23.8 0 5.2 10.9 100 0
r=2 44.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r=3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.9
r=4 55.6 38.6 0 0 0 9.9 0 0 0 0
5.8 A Multi-Period Market for Obligations
In this section, the model for obligations is extended to consider different trading periods.
Since FTRs are used to hedge against congestion in the energy market, the holder is
entitled to collect a share of congestion rents regardless when congestion occurs. In order
to increase flexibility, FTR can be issued for different time periods. FTRs can be issued
to collect congestion rents at specific time periods. For instance, there can be off-peak,
on-peak and full day (off- plus on-peak) periods. For the model derived in this section, any
time period, such as off- or on-peak periods, is characterized by t ∈ T ; while Γ is used to
denote the full horizon, such as a full day. Due to the full day period overlaps with any
other period t, the terms related to such a period are explicitly modelled in the formulation.
All variables and parameters from §5.3 are recalled and indexed over the time periods.
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5.8.1 FTR bidders problem
As long as a participant ν has the flexibility to bid for FTRs of different periods, its










































s.t. 0 ≤ τ tν,ℓ ≤ τ
t
ν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ F
t
ν , t ∈ T , (5.85)
0 ≤ τΓν,ℓ ≤ τ
Γ






















i , ∀i ∈ I. (5.88)
5.8.2 ISO problem
The ISO problem is to maximize the revenue from the sales of FTRs through the trading












For any combination of FTRs to be chosen, there is a need to ensure a simultaneous
feasibility; thus, the ISO’s decisions (pti, p
Γ
i ) have to be feasible for the transmission system







i ) ≤ z
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i ) ≤ z
−
k , ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T . (5.91)
At period t, the net power injections in the system are composed by both the nodal power
injection pti, corresponding to the current time period t, and the nodal power injection
from the full horizon pΓi . Therefore, FTRs of period t are going to be competing for the
transmission capacity with FTRs of period Γ.
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5.8.3 Market clearing condition
At each period, the demand for transmission services, required by all bidders, must equal












ν,ℓ , ∀i ∈ I. (5.93)
5.8.4 Equilibrium model
The optimal allocation of FTRs can be characterized by the following MLCP:
• For τ tν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ F
t
ν , ν ∈ Θ, t ∈ T :





















ν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.94)
• For τΓν,ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ F
Γ
ν , ν ∈ Θ:





















ν,ℓ ≥ 0 (5.95)
• For µtν,ℓ, ℓ ∈ F
t
ν , ν ∈ Θ, t ∈ T :




ν,k ≥ 0 (5.96)
• For µΓν,ℓ, ℓ ∈ F
Γ
ν , ν ∈ Θ:




ν,k ≥ 0 (5.97)
• For pti, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T :










• For pΓi , ∀i ∈ I:
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k ≥ 0 (5.100)












k ≥ 0 (5.101)
• For ω∗ti , ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T :








• For ω∗Γi , ∀i ∈ I:

























i ), gives an equilibrium point for the FTRs’ awards.
Proposition 5.6 In a multi-period market for FTRs, the congestion prices for the full
day period are composed by the congestion prices of the off- and on-peak periods.
Proof. Recalling equilibrium conditions (5.98) and (5.99), the congestion prices for periods
















k ), ∀i ∈ I. (5.105)




ω∗ti , ∀i ∈ I, (5.106)
as claimed 
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From this proof, it is straightforward to conclude that given the same FTR for all time
periods, the FTR price in the full day is the sum of the prices from off- and on-peak




The test system described in §5.6.1 is extended to a multi-period market case. Three
periods in the market are considered: i) off-peak; ii) on-peak; and iii) full-day. The linear
parameters of the FTR benefit functions are given in Table 5.13. The maximum value for
all FTRs is of 1500 MW.
Table 5.13: Linear parameter values (βν,ℓ) of the benefit functions.
ν, ℓ Off-peak On-peak Full-day
1, 1 2 4.5 6
2, 1 2 2 5
As less congestion can be expected in the off-peak period, the corresponding benefit
functions characterize a low willingness to acquire FTRs. On the other side, FTRs can
become more valuable in the on-peak period as more congestion may arise. Furthermore,
FTRs for the full day can have a higher expectation than those of the on-peak period. This
is because with full-day FTRs the holder will collect moneys from both off- and on-peak
periods. The results for this case are summarized in Table 5.14.
In the multi-period market, the FTRs of all periods are simultaneously allocated. Since
full-day FTRs overlap with the off-peak and on-peak FTRs, their prices become inter-
related. For this case, the optimal solution is to allocate FTRs in both the off- and on-
peak periods. The allocation in off- and on-peak periods is the same as if every period
were independently cleared. However, no right is allocated to the full-day period. This is
because of the low evaluation to acquire such FTRs in comparison to the composed value
of off- and on-peak FTRs. The marginal values of full-day FTRs are $6/MW and $5/MW ;
nonetheless, the clearing prices for them are $6.5/MW and $6/MW , which are the sum of
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Table 5.14: Multi-period market outcome. Three-node system.
Off-peak On-peak Full-day
τ1,1 τ2,1 τ1,1 τ2,1 τ1,1 τ2,1
Award (MW ) 350 200 350 200 0 0
Price ($/MW ) 2 2 4.5 4.0 6.5 6.0
Cost ($) 700 400 1575 800 0 0
Benefit($) 700 400 1575 800 0 0
Surplus($) 0 0 0 0 0 0
ISO Revenue ($) 1100 2375 0
the clearing prices from the off- and on-peak periods.
A thirty-node system
The thirty-node system from §5.7.6 is used here for a multi-period market case. There are
twenty FTRs and nine FTR portfolios; this makes a total of 540 FTRs in the market. For
each time period, the parameter values of the benefit functions are randomly generated.
The prices and awards for FTRs are listed in Tables 5.15 and 5.16.
Table 5.15: FTR prices (in $/MW ). Multi-period market.
ℓ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Off-peak 6.6 7.6 16.8 6.8 7.2 7.2 8.9 21.3 19.2 7.5
On-peak 11.8 12.9 32.5 14.1 15.0 12.8 12.3 35.7 29.0 12.3
Full-day 18.4 20.5 49.3 20.9 22.3 20.1 21.2 57.1 48.2 19.9
Two features can be highlighted for this example. First, for all FTRs, the sum of prices
ℓ 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Off-peak 7.2 8.2 7.8 6.7 6.0 7.6 8.8 21.3 8.8 6.8
On-peak 11.5 13.9 13.2 12.6 15.6 16.9 10.9 41.3 11.8 13.5
Full-day 18.8 22.1 21.1 19.3 21.7 24.5 19.7 62.7 20.6 20.4
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of off-peak and on-peak periods equals the prices of the full-day period. Second, when
FTRs are to be allocated to full-day FTRs, no capacity is allocated to off- or on-peak
periods; meanwhile, the capacity allocated to off-peak FTRs is the same capacity allocated
to on-peak FTRs.
Table 5.16: FTR awards (in MW ). Multi-period market.
ν 1 2 3
ℓ 7 10 11 15 20 1 4 5 6 12
Off-peak 0 0 0 0 0 0 95.3 0 0 0
On-peak 0 0 0 154.4 11.2 0 0 0 39.8 0
Full-day 43.8 21.1 42.5 0 0 81.7 0 29.3 0 17.4
ν 3 4 5 7
ℓ 13 16 17 19 14 4 6 15 20
Off-peak 0 40 0 0 0 0 39.8 154.4 11.2
On-peak 0 40 0 0 0 95.4 0 0 0
Full-day 24.8 0 12.9 36.5 222.5 0 0 0 0
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5.9 Summary
An alternative framework for modelling competition in markets for financial transmission
rights of power systems has been presented. The proposed models are based upon equi-
librium conditions for all the agents that participate in the transmission market. The
conjectured congestion-price response function gives the flexibility to analyze the influence
on prices by specific FTRs. Within this unified framework, different markets for FTRs can
be easily modelled, and the interactions of different kind of FTRs can be analyzed. Due
to the convexity nature of the formulation, the proposed framework is computationally
tractable for larger systems.
The models proposed in this chapter can be useful as a mechanism to study bidding
strategies and their impact on congestion prices. Through numerical examples, it has
been shown that bidders can reduce the congestion prices they face without decreasing the
amount of awarded FTRs, and that bidders can more easily impact congestion prices of
options. However, for the same degree of manipulation, the impact on congestion prices is
stronger for the case of obligations. This arises because obligations are more inter-related
among them through counterflows. This also suggests that markets for options can be
more susceptible to price manipulation since bidders can individually impact transmission
constraints.
The introduction of new products, such as auction revenue rights, may create extra
incentives for bidders, and produce more complex interaction within markets. The proposed
framework can be useful to study these further developments.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary of Contributions
Due to the complexity of electricity markets, there has been an increasing need to elaborate
more sophisticated models for the proper analysis of competition and market efficiency. The
research in this thesis has been focused on the development of more comprehensive models
for competition in the markets for energy, spinning reserve and financial transmission rights.
These models provide more realism to the incentives and impact of participants strategies
in the markets.
In Chapter 3, an equilibrium model for imperfect competition has been developed. Such
a model is a direct extension of a model described in [18]. In this research direction, the
following works have been conducted:
• In contrast to most previous static models, a dynamic model for oligopolistic com-
petition in energy markets has been developed in this work; temporal constraints
and energy limits have been included. Through numerical examples, the impact of
these constraints has been illustrated. Such kind of model and analysis has not been
explicitly performed in previous works.
• A joint market for energy and spinning reserve has been proposed. In various real-
world markets, a joint optimization of products is carried out. Thus, an integrated
approach for modelling competition is a better representation of actual markets. Fur-
thermore, the strategic behaviour of suppliers in the spinning reserve market is here
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addressed. This is included by means of a conjecture spinning reserve price function.
• An analytical derivation to quantify the opportunity cost between energy and spinning
reserve has been carried out. Even for large systems, this derivation allows one to
identify which elements are impacting the opportunity cost, and how both energy
and spinning reserve prices are affecting each other. This formulation defines the
opportunity cost for a whole range of strategy behaviors, ranging from the Cournot
to the competitive one. No previous mathematical derivation has been previously
carried out in this direction.
• Financial transmission rights have been included in the models of imperfect compe-
tition in order to analyze their impact on the market. In contrast to previous works
applied to small systems, the proposed model can be easily applied to large power
systems where there are GenCos with many generation units and portfolios of FTRs.
In Chapter 4, the impact of FTRs on the strategic behaviour of generators is extended.
Screening and mitigation of the exacerbation of market power due to the ownership of
financial transmission rights have been studied. The contributions made in this direction
are as follows:
• An index, called Hedging Position Ratio, has been proposed to determine the po-
tential hedging level of each FTR bid. This index is based upon the actual impact
that each participant has on the energy market, and upon the potential impact that
would have with the FTR bid. Numerical examples show that this kind of ratio may
identify the gambling opportunities that some FTRs can provide to their holders to
exacerbate market power.
• A modified market for financial transmission rights is presented. Unlike actual mar-
kets, bids for the maximum amount of FTRs to be contracted are modified accordingly
to the hedging position that such FTRs would provide to their holders. In this way,
critical FTR bids are left out or reduced in the allocation process.
• Through the inclusion of contingencies, the effect of changes in the network configu-
ration on the hedging position ratios has been presented with a numerical example.
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It is shown that even with such changes, the hedging ratios identify critical FTRs as
these ratios are based on the system network conditions.
In Chapter 5, equilibrium models of markets for financial transmission rights are pre-
sented. These models are introduced with the goal to provide insights on the impact that
bidders can have on the congestion prices. Contributions in this chapter are as follows:
• A unified modelling framework of markets for: i) options, ii) obligations and iii)
joint obligations and options is presented. In addition, equilibrium models have
been formulated for multi-period and multi-round markets for obligations. Based
on the latter models, extensions for options , and joint obligations and options are
straightforward.
• Two kinds of conjectured congestion-price response functions have been introduced
to characterize the effect on congestion prices from bidders strategies.
• Based on equilibrium conditions, it is shown that: i) active transmission constraints
define the prices for transmission rights, ii) the prices for options are non-negative,
iii) the price of an option is equal to or higher than the price for an obligation, for
the same FTR, and iv) the price of an obligation in the full horizon period is the sum
of all period prices.
• The effect of bidding strategies on congestion prices is presented through numerical
examples. It is shown that the bidders’ influence on market prices is higher with obli-
gations than it is with options. However, with options, bidders can more individually
impact the congestion prices.
None of the equilibrium models here presented has been previously formulated.
6.2 Directions for Future Research
In regard to future work on imperfect competition that is described in Chapter 3, the
following directions are proposed:
• Based on the conjecture formulation, market power analysis can be extended to ca-
pacity markets.
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• New schemes for provision of reserves in a locational basis are being proposed [41].
However, transmission constraints restrain the access not only to energy but also to
reserves. The study of market power within a region-based scheme to provide reserves
should be pursued.
• The proposed model is based on thermal generation units. A direct extension is the
inclusion of hydro generation units. In addition, a further step in the analysis of
oligopoly markets is to include the transmission-system losses.
• Models to consider cases of incomplete information are now being considered [137].
Although these models require assumptions on the kind of incomplete information,
comparisons between the cases of complete information and those with different as-
sumption of incomplete information should be pursued.
• Since trades of power can be done either through the Pool or by Bilateral Contracts
(BC), a mixed Pool/BC model for oligopoly is an issue worth of research.
In regard to future work on models and markets for transmission rights presented in
Chapter 4 and 5, the following directions are proposed:
• Markets for obligations and options with multi-rounds and multi-periods are becom-
ing the standard framework for trading FTRs. However, the implementation of this
kind of market faces computational challenges. The computational burden imposed
by the introduction of options demands alternative approaches; models based on
mixed integer techniques may be a worthy option to be explored.
• The proposed equilibrium models and analysis can be extended to the case of FGRs,
and the joint issuance of FTRs and FGRs. This would allow one to identify the
potential impact of bidders strategies on very specific transmission constraints, which
may become a concern in major interfaces.
• The ownership of auction revenue rights may give extra incentives for strategic bidding
in markets for FTRs [68]. The proposed equilibrium framework should be extended to
account for ARRs ownership into bidders strategies. Unlike the analytical procedure
for a two-node system in [68], the equilibrium model version could be used for larger
systems.
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Appendix A
Power Distribution Factors
Throughout this thesis, different kinds of power distribution factors have been used; they
are next defined.
Definition A.1 (Sensitivity Factors) Let us consider a vector of power injections p =
[p1, p2, ..., ps, ... pI ]
T , noting that ps is the injection at the slack node. The real power
flow zij , through any transmission line between nodes i and j, can be defined in terms of
nodal power injections by using the sensitivity (power distribution) factors. These factors
quantify the change in a line power flow, ∆zij , by a change of power injection at a specific
node, subject to its respective balance adjustment at the slack node, i.e.,
〈 sij , ∆p 〉 = ∆zij , (A.1)
with
〈 e , ∆p 〉 = 0. (A.2)





where Xil and Xjl are elements of the reactance matrix, and xij is the reactance for the
line ij ∈ K.
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Definition A.2 (Power Transfer Distribution Factors [PTDFs]) Given a point-to-
point transaction ℓ (with r and t denoting the injection and withdrawal nodes, respectively),
the Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs), ̺ij,ℓ, (corresponding to the transmission
line between nodes i and j) can be computed as the superposition of two transactions:
one between the injection and slack nodes, and another between the slack and withdrawal
nodes; thus, based on the sensitivity factors, it is given by
̺ij,ℓ = sij,r − sij,t. (A.4)
Given 1MW to be transmitted from r to t, a PTDF ̺ij,ℓ stands for the fraction of the power
that will flow through the transmission line ij.
Definition A.3 (Generalized Generation and Load Distribution Factors [127])
The acronyms GGDFs and GLDFs are used in this thesis to denote the Generalized Gen-
eration Distribution Factors and the Generalized Loads Distribution Factors.
In the case of GGDFs, a power flow zij can be expressed as a linear combination of
generations, i.e.,
zij = 〈ϕij , g 〉. (A.5)
A new power flow ẑij is produced by an increase in generation ∆ gl, at a node l, with
a compensation at the slack node, i.e.,
ẑij = 〈ϕij , g 〉+ (ϕij,l − ϕij,s) ∆ gl. (A.6)
From (A.5), it becomes
ẑij − zij = (ϕij,l − ϕij,s) ∆ gl. (A.7)
A change in generation, at node l, can also be given in terms of sensitivity factors, i.e.,
sij,l∆gl = ∆zij = ẑij − zij. (A.8)
By comparing (A.7) and (A.8) one gets
ϕij,l − ϕij,s = sij,l. (A.9)
By transferring all the generation to the slack node and using superposition, (A.8) is
ẑij − zij = −〈 sij , g 〉. (A.10)
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Since
ẑij = ϕij,sgs, (A.11)
where
gs = 〈 e , g 〉. (A.12)
Thus, (A.10) becomes
ϕij,sgs = zij − 〈 sij , g 〉. (A.13)
The (GGDF) transmission usage factor ϕij,s is given by
ϕij,s =
zij − 〈 sij , g 〉
〈 e , g 〉
. (A.14)
A similar procedure can be applied to derive the GLDFs.
Appendix B
Test Systems Data
B.1 Five-node System Data
For this test system, transmission lines’ data are listed in Table B.1. Suppliers are modelled
with cost functions defined as ci(pi) = βipi + γip
2
i , where βi and γi are parameters. Supply
bids are given in Table B.2 The inelastic loads at nodes 2, 4 and 5 are 300 MW.












Figure B.1: Five-node power system.
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Table B.1: Transmission lines data. Five-node system.
Line Source Sink xij zi
k i j (p.u.) (MW)
1 1 2 .0281 400
2 1 3 .0064 400
3 1 4 .0304 250
4 2 5 .0108 350
5 3 4 .0297 240
6 4 5 .0297 240




i (MW ) (MW ) ($/MW ) ($/MW 2)
1 0 110 14 .0140
2 0 100 15 .0140
3 0 600 10 .0025
4 0 150 30 .0250
5 0 520 30 .0250
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Table B.3: Financial transmission rights bids.
ℓ Bidder Source Sink βℓ γℓ τ ℓ
r t ($/MW ) ($/MW 2) (MW )
1 G1 1 2 20 0.0050 110
2 G2 1 2 21 0.0060 100
3 L3 1 2 25 0.0050 300
4 G4 1 4 50 0.0050 120
5 L1 1 4 60 0.0025 300
6 G3 1 4 45 0.0050 580
7 G1 1 5 30 0.0035 110
8 L2 1 5 35 0.0035 300
9 L3 1 5 35 0.0025 300
10 G4 2 5 60 0.0015 120
11 L3 2 5 40 0.0040 300
12 L2 2 5 50 0.0040 300
13 G1 2 4 60 0.0025 110
14 G4 2 4 65 0.0020 120
15 L2 2 4 60 0.0030 300
16 G3 3 4 60 0.0020 580
17 G4 3 4 70 0.0025 150
18 L1 3 4 65 0.0015 300
19 G1 3 5 40 0.0050 110
20 G3 3 5 45 0.0025 580
21 L2 3 5 42 0.0040 300
22 G3 3 2 20 0.0020 580
23 G2 3 2 22 0.0010 100
24 L3 3 2 25 0.0030 300
25 G4 5 4 15 0.0040 120
26 L3 5 4 15 0.0035 300
27 L1 5 4 16 0.0035 300
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Table B.4: Benefit function parameters for FTRs.
ν ℓ Source Sink βℓ γℓ τ ℓ
($/MW ) ($/MW 2) (MW )
1 1 2 20 0.0050 110
2 1 4 50 0.0050 120
3 1 5 30 0.0035 110
4 2 5 60 0.0015 120
1 5 2 4 60 0.0025 110
6 3 4 60 0.0020 580
7 3 5 40 0.0050 110
8 3 2 20 0.0020 580
9 5 4 15 0.0040 120
1 1 2 21 0.0060 100
2 1 4 60 0.0025 300
3 1 5 35 0.0035 300
4 2 5 40 0.0040 300
2 5 2 4 65 0.0020 120
6 3 4 70 0.0025 150
7 3 5 45 0.0025 580
8 3 2 22 0.0010 100
9 5 4 15 0.0035 300
1 1 2 25 0.0050 300
2 1 4 45 0.0050 580
3 1 5 35 0.0025 300
4 2 5 50 0.0040 300
3 5 2 4 60 0.0030 300
6 3 4 65 0.0015 300
7 3 5 42 0.0040 300
8 3 2 25 0.0030 300
9 5 4 16 0.0035 300
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B.2 Thirty-node System Data
The transmission data are listed in Table B.5, while the suppliers and loads data are given
in Tables B.6 and B.7, respectively. For this case, the supply bids are linear and all the
loads are considered inelastic.
Table B.5: Transmission lines data. Thirty-node system.
Line Source Sink xij zi Line Source Sink xij zi
k i j (p.u.) (MW) k i j (p.u.) (MW)
1 1 2 0.0575 125 22 12 13 0.1400 75
2 1 3 0.1852 125 23 12 14 0.2559 30
3 2 4 0.1737 50 24 12 15 0.1304 30
4 3 4 0.0379 100 25 12 16 0.1987 30
5 2 5 0.1983 70 26 14 15 0.1997 20
6 2 6 0.1763 75 27 16 17 0.1932 20
7 4 6 0.0414 100 28 15 18 0.2185 20
8 4 12 0.2560 50 29 18 19 0.1292 20
9 5 7 0.1160 75 30 19 20 0.0680 20
10 6 7 0.0820 125 31 15 23 0.2020 20
11 6 8 0.0420 30 32 21 22 0.0236 30
12 6 9 0.2080 75 33 22 24 0.1790 20
13 6 10 0.5560 30 34 23 24 0.2700 20
14 6 28 0.0599 20 35 24 25 0.3292 20
15 8 28 0.2000 30 36 25 26 0.3800 20
16 9 11 0.2080 40 37 25 27 0.2087 20
17 9 10 0.1100 75 38 27 29 0.4153 20
18 10 20 0.2090 30 39 27 30 0.6027 20
19 10 17 0.0845 30 40 28 27 0.3960 50
20 10 21 0.0749 30 41 29 30 0.4530 20
21 10 22 0.1499 30
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i (MW) (MW) ($/MW)
1 1 0 150 30.0
2 2 0 175 28.5
3 3 0 50 25.0
4 8 0 100 30.0
5 11 0 100 30.0
6 13 0 125 37.0
7 14 0 200 40.0
8 17 0 50 35.0
9 18 0 100 32.0
10 22 0 150 40.0
11 23 0 150 37.0
12 27 0 120 45.0
13 7 0 75 45.0
Table B.7: Demand data. Thirty-node system.
Demand Node di Demand Node di
i (MW) i (MW)
1 3 100 11 18 30
2 5 75 12 19 10
3 7 50 13 20 35
4 8 20 14 21 20
5 10 50 15 23 50
6 12 30 16 24 5
7 13 15 17 25 10
8 14 50 18 26 10
9 15 30 19 27 50
10 16 5 20 29 20
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B.3 57-node System Data
Table B.8: Generation units data. 57-node system.
ν h i gν,i,h αν,i,h βν,i,h ∆ gν,i,h ∆ gν,i,h
(MW ) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) (MW/h) (MW/h)
1 1 680 3 10 40 40
1 2 3 250 8 25 40 40
3 9 100 12 35 40 40
1 2 200 10.5 32 40 40
2 2 6 400 6.5 20 40 40
3 8 650 3.5 11 40 40
3 1 12 510 4 13 40 40
2 15 375 6 18 40 40
4 1 25 175 10 24 40 40
2 29 200 7 24 40 40
5 1 38 150 9 27.5 40 40
2 49 300 6.5 20 40 40
6 1 54 380 4 12 40 40
7 1 17 375 6 24 40 40
1 32 220 10 38 40 40
Table B.9: Peak demands for the 57-node system (in MW).
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
di 105 52.5 70 0 44.5 131.25 0 175 140 61.25 0 87.5 66.5 54.25 56
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
di 79 56 64.75 57.75 78.75 0 0 78.75 0 78.75 0 70 87.5 47.5 60
i 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
di 101.5 52.5 70 0 105 0 0 77 0 0 64.75 42.25 43.75 61.25 0
i 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57
di 0 52.5 0 84 56 49 61.25 70 71.75 82.25 66.5 82.25
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B.4 118-node System Data
Table B.10: Generation units data. 118-node system.
ν h i βν,i,h gν,i,h
($/MWh) (MW )
1 1 25 200
1 12 30 285
1 49 15 400
1 1 59 17 350
1 65 12 590
1 69 8 820
1 89 9 700
1 10 12 550
1 25 16 420
1 26 14 500
1 46 24 220
2 1 54 23 250
1 61 16 360
1 66 16 590
1 80 10 675
1 100 15 350
1 4 25 220
3 1 6 26 200
1 8 26 200
1 15 25 200
4 1 18 25 200
1 19 26 200
1 24 28 200
1 27 26 200
5 1 31 25 200
1 113 27 200
1 116 30 200
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Table B.11: Generation units data (Continued).
ν h i βν,i,h gν,i,h
($/MWh) (MW )
1 32 24 200
6 1 34 24 200
1 90 28 200
1 36 27 200
7 1 85 25 200
1 87 28 200
1 40 28 200
8 1 42 28 200
1 55 25 200
1 62 26 200
9 1 56 24 200
1 111 26 200
10 1 70 35 200
1 72 35 200
1 73 32 200
11 1 74 35 200
1 76 34 200
1 77 25.5 200
1 91 27 200
12 1 103 32 240
1 104 26 200
1 92 26 200
13 1 99 26.5 220
1 111 26 250
1 105 22 200
14 1 107 25 200
1 110 23 200
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Table B.12: Demands for the 118-node system (in MW).
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
di 76.5 30 58.5 45 0 78 28.5 0 0 0 105 70.5 51 21 135 37.5
i 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
di 16.5 90 67.5 42 21 15 10.5 0 0 0 93 25.5 36 0 64.5 88.5
i 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
di 34.5 88.5 49.5 46.5 0 0 40.5 30 55.5 55.5 27 24 79.5 42 51
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61
di 30 130.5 25.5 25.5 27 34.5 169.5 94.5 81 18 18 415.5 117 0
i 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
di 115 0 0 0 58.5 42 0 0 99 0 0 0 102 70.5 102 91.5
i 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
di 106.5 58.5 195 0 81 30 16.5 36 31.5 0 72 0 117 0 97.5
i 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107
di 18 45 63 57 22.5 51 0 55.5 33 15 34.5 57 46.5 64.5 42
i 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
di 15 12 58.5 0 37.5 0 12 33 0 30 49.5
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Table B.13: Financial transmission rights portfolios (in MW).
ν 1 2 3 4 5
m 49 65 69 69 54 61 66 80 – 24 19 10 27 31 116
ℓ 70 74 75 29 70 76 11 118 – 12 6 15 19 76 118
τ ν,m,ℓ 140 100 85 200 170 150 120 75 – 100 50 30 60 62 56
ν 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
m 32 85 55 40 112 – 77 67 91 99 105 110
ℓ 4 74 60 35 117 – 74 73 82 74 117 118
τ ν,m,ℓ 40 65 48 50 68 – 50 45 80 35 85 35
